Author: Acquire@pos

One who has either spoken rechilus, listened as someone else spoke rechilus, or believed a statement that is classified as rechilus, must engage in the teshuva process appropriate for his transgression.
One who spoke rechilus should preferably approach anyone who was present when he made the statement and explain that it was inaccurate. Otherwise, he must approach the subject of his remark and beg his forgiveness for having spoken rechilus concerning him.
One who listened to rechilus need not ask forgiveness of the person spoken about even if he had believed the statement. However, if he did believe the statement, he must convince himself that the information may have been totally inaccurate and taken out of context.
In all of the above situations, one must confess before Hashem for having violated a Torah commandment, express regret for what he did, and resolve to avoid repetition of his misdeed.

As in the case of loshon hora, the one instance where rechilus may be believed as fact is where the report confirms a suspicion already supported by evidence which would be insufficient on its own. If, for example, someone’s strange behavior is a clear indication of his having done something wrong, and a person then claims to have witnessed the act, one may believe the person’s account. This does not, however, permit sharing the information with others, unless there is a halachically acceptable constructive purpose in doing so.

In summation, rechilus may be spoken and listened to for a constructive purpose, but it may be believed only when supported by circumstantial evidence.

When someone makes an innocent statement without realizing the consequences of what he is saying, people tend to accept his word as fact. Halachah, too, accepts such statements as fact in certain specific instances. (These are: as testimony regarding a man’s death in order that his wife be permitted to remarry; in determining the status of food that had been suspected of being non-kosher by rabbinic law; or where the facts will eventually come to light in any case.) Rechilus, however, cannot be accepted as fact even when a statement was made off-handedly.

Halachah does recognize that there are individuals who are so precise, both in perception as well as in their conveying of facts, that hearing their account is tantamount to witnessing the act in person. One would be permitted to believe even rechilus told by such individuals, but could not share the information with others.

As stated in the laws of loshon hora, the Chofetz Chaim contends that no one today can claim to posses this degree of integrity; therefore, one should not rely on this halachah in practice.

One may not believe rechilus even if it was related in public. The fact that a person is unafraid to publicly relate information that is cause for ill will is not proof of its authenticity and certainly not of its accuracy.

Furthermore, even if an accusation is made in the presence of the subject and the accused fails to respond, one may not interpret his silence as self-incrimination. The person may have been flustered and at a loss for words, of he may have chosen to remain silent rather than cause an escalation of the verbal abuse hurled at him.

It is forbidden to believe rechilus even if the speaker is someone very close to the listener and would not want to draw him into a feud unnecessarily. Even though it is clear that the speaker has only the good of the listener in mind, his account of the story may not be accepted as fact.

If one finds it difficult to convince himself that the report is totally false, he must, at the very least, assume that the speaker’s interpretation of the incident is mistaken and that no ill will was intended by the subject. (As stated above, if the report was intended to save him from harm, he must, of course, protect himself on the possibility that it may be true.)

In light of the prohibition against believing rechilus, one might ask: How can we ever consider such information to be constructive and permit listening to it? What purpose could there be in listening to information which one is not permitted to believe?

The answer to this is found in the halachah which differentiates between acceptance of rechilus as fact, which is prohibited, and the taking of appropriate precautions on the chance that the report may be true, which is proper. To believe rechilus is foolish and wicked; to ignore it is naive and irresponsible.

While one must not allow his relationship with the person to be affected by what was said about him, one must protect himself from the possibility of harm.

If a person was present when a statement was made or an act was committed by an individual, and then someone else who was present points out to the person that the act was intended to hurt him, he may not believe this interpretation of what had transpired. Not only is it wrong to believe a report that is rechilus, it is also prohibited to accept an insight that transforms an innocent occurrence into a malicious act.

Unlike listening to rechilus, which is justified when the information is pertinent, believing rechilus is not permissible regardless of one’s purpose. Even if one must inquire about a person with whom he is considering entering into a relationship, he may not believe as fact any negative information that has been told about the person. Never may one develop feelings of hatred towards a person on the basis of information heard about him – even though the information was obtained in a permissible manner.

The prohibition which forbids acceptance of loshon hora or rechilus, which we have translated “Do not accept a false report,” uses the term “shav,” which literally means vain or meaningless. Clearly, the inference is that negative speech is not often to be given credence.

It is often difficult, if not impossible, for a speaker to convey every detail and all background information that is crucial for an accurate understanding of a given occurrence. Certainly, if the speaker is violating halachah by relating rechilus, one dare not assume that he is being careful to speak only the truth. Therefore, as in the case of loshon hora, belief of secondhand information in a way that could cause ill feelings among people is unjustified and prohibited.

There are instances where one may listen to rechilus although the information is not at all pertinent to him.

When an individual is experiencing sadness or extreme anxiety and is in need of someone with whom to share his frustration, it is considered an act of kindness to lend a sympathetic ear and listen to his troubles. One must be certain, though, that the circumstances do, in fact, demand this. Also, such expression should not become a regular occurrence for the speaker. Finally, care must be taken that the speaker not wander from the matter at hand and offer negative remarks which are not relevant.

One may also listen to rechilus if his intention is to make the speaker understand that his perception of the situation, and of those of whom he speaks negatively, is mistaken.

Not only may one listen to rechilus that is important for him to hear, he may even approach someone and request information that would otherwise be considered rechilus. Obviously, the solicitor must make it clear that his solicitation is sanctioned by halachah.

One must also be careful to request only pertinent information and nothing more. Should the person from whom the information was requested begin relating unnecessary gossip, he should be stopped immediately.

For one to listen to rechilus within the framework of halachah, it is not sufficient that the listener be justified in paying attention to the information being conveyed; the speaker, too, must have constructive intent. If the speaker is unaware that the information he is relating is of significance to the listener, then he is guilty of speaking rechilus. The listener, then, is cause for the speaker’s transgression and has violated the prohibition “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block” (Vayikra 19:14), which prohibits one from causing another Jew to sin.

Thus, it is the responsibility of the listener to explain to the speaker that the information is important for him to hear and is therefore not considered gossip.

If the speaker was already in the process of relating the gossip to others when a person to whom the information is relevant appeared on the scene, he would not be guilty of causing the speaker to transgress. Even so, it is proper for the listener to explain why he is listening, so that the others will realize that he is not transgressing and that he considers their non-constructive listening a sin.

Just as it is not lowly to speak (what would otherwise be considered) rechilus for a constructive purpose, so too it is not wrong to listen to rechilus if the listener honestly believes that it is important for him to be aware of the information. This includes any discussion that could help the listener protect himself from others who plan to harm him, or to protect others from damage about to be inflicted upon them. It is also permissible to listen to information that could be of help in rectifying damage already done to oneself or others.

In these cases, the discussion is not labeled as “gossip”; rather it is constructive speech.

There are, unfortunately, people who forever gossip, perhaps as a result of their inactivity and their need for social involvement. Unless one honestly feels that he can help such a person to mend his ways, he should avoid his company entirely. If contact with such a person unavoidable, it should be minimized to whatever degree possible.

One must also avoid settings that are prone to discussions of gossip. Ideally, one should find a way to permanently change the nature of conversation at such settings so that those present will be spared the evils of rechilus.

When one finds himself in the company of someone speaking rechilus and finds it difficult to interrupt the speaker, he must leave. If one cannot bring himself to actually walk away, he must, at the very least, not pay attention to what is being said and must make it clear through facial expression that he disapproves of the discussion.

From the wording of the verse which requires a Jew to reprove his fellow when he sins (Vayikra 19:17), the Sages derive that one must do so without embarrassing the sinner. Thus, when a person is relating gossip in the company of others, it is preferable that a listener change the subject and later rebuke the speaker privately. One may openly protest gossipmongering in a way that causes the speaker discomfort only if there is no other way to bring his monologue to an end.

As in the case of loshon hora, it is forbidden to listen to rechilus spoken by one’s parents, siblings or spouse. Familial closeness is not a reason to share information that promotes strife and ill will among Jews.

When subjected to gossip, one is required not only to distance himself from the conversation, but must also reprove the speaker for violating a Torah commandment. Only when rebuke will cause the gossiper to speak with greater malice should one not offer rebuke.

If one’s employer or colleagues are prone to gossip, one must ignore their conversations. (One is not required to offer reproof if this might cause him to lose his job. Fulfillment of a positive commandment [such as the mitzvah to offer reproof] does not require a monetary risk of such magnitude. However, one should attempt to voice disapproval at some point so as not to be guilty of chanufah (false flattery.)

In all situations, the listener must do his best to stop the gossip – perhaps by tactfully changing the subject.

It is forbidden to listen to gossip when it involves others, and even more so when it involves how others dislike the listener himself. (When there is a constructive purpose in the listener knowing such information, listening may be permissible. This will be discussed later.) It is forbidden to listen to accounts of how others have spoken negatively about one’s family members or friends. Such listening usually serves no constructive purpose and causes the listener to dislike the person mentioned.

As in the case of loshon hora, one must do his best to ignore someone who is about to begin or has already begun to speak rechilus. If someone begins talking of how one person has wronged another, to willfully listen as he continues to speak is, according the the Chofetz Chaim, in violation of “Do not accept a false report” (Shemos 23:1). Just as it is lowly to speak gossip, so too it is not befitting a respectable human being to listen to gossip.

Having discussed the laws of constructive speech regarding both loshon hora and rechilus, it becomes obvious that there are no shortcuts in deciding whether or not to speak up for a constructive purpose. Silence when in doubt may be true of non-constructive situations, but when someone else’s life – or quality of life – hangs in the balance, one may be required to become involved. One must be well versed in the proper applications of the seven conditions for constructive speech listed above (see Day 50) or at least be in contact with an authority who is well versed in these matters.

We have already detailed the laws of loshon hora as they apply to a teacher who wishes to discuss his or her students with others (see Day 60). An additional concern for a teacher is that of giluy sod, sharing information that was related in confidence by a student.

A common situation, especially among teachers of younger children, is where the student divulges information concerning his family that his parents would certainly not want anyone to know. Under no circumstances may the teacher believe such information if it involves negativity or if its becoming known could cause the family harm; obviously, the teacher may not relate to others what was said by the child. Moreover, to inform the parents of what the child said may be rechilus (as it may cause ill will between the parent and the child) or onaas devarim, causing hurt through the spoken word. In certain situations, it may be correct for the teacher to speak to the parents, so that they can caution the child not to repeat such information again.

If, however, the child mentions something that is cause for alarm, the teacher’s involvement may be necessary. This is especially true when the information involves abuse. The matter must be investigated, and –when necessary– the proper authorities should be contacted.

When older students share personal information with a teacher, the teacher may not pass the information on to others. If the advice of colleagues or supervisors is necessary, the student’s identity should not be divulged. The teacher may reveal the information, along with the student’s identity, only when a student discloses facts of which halachah requires him to inform others. This includes any medical condition or behavioral problem of which the school administration should have been informed (e.g. chemical imbalance). As in the case of the therapist or lawyer, a teacher should be in contact with a halachic authority in dealing with issues of confidentiality.

A lawyer may not assist a client in committing an injustice. A lawyer may not represent a client in a lawsuit to attain payment which the client admits is not due him. Thus, a lawyer may not present medical bills which the client has informed him are fictitious. A lawyer too, should seek the guidance of a halachic authority so that he will conduct his practice in strict adherence to Torah law.

Similarly, a therapist may not assist a client in living an immoral lifestyle. Jewish therapists must be guided in their work by qualified rabbanim who are well versed in the relevant areas of halachah.

The commandment, Do not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is being shed (Vayikra 19:16), presents a major dilemma for the professional whose effectiveness, reputation and livelihood rest on the confidence placed in him by his clientele. Often, a client will reveal to his lawyer or therapist information that is being withheld from someone unjustly.

Whenever possible, a therapist must convince his client that he has a moral obligation to divulge such information to the proper party. Where appropriate, the client should be made to understand that despite the consequences, he will experience a sense of relief after having revealed the information. Moreover, by being honest and open in his personal life, one is able to develop a more positive self-image.

Should the client persist in his refusal to divulge such information to the proper party, the lawyer or therapist may be faced with the painful choice of either allowing a destructive relationship to materialize, or possibly jeopardizing his livelihood and reputation. Consultation with a competent halachic authority is a must in such situations. This would also apply to a physician who is aware that his chronically ill patient is seeking to marry. When bringing such matters before a halachic authority, one should not mention the names of the parties involved unless absolutely necessary.

As stated above, disclosure of an item told in confidence is prohibited as avak rechilus (see Day 136). An extremely sensitive area not discussed in the Sefer Chofetz Chaim is that of disclosing confidential information for a constructive purpose.

It is obvious however, that if halachah requires a person to disclose a matter to a particular individual and he discloses it to a different person instead, while insisting that it remain confidential, his wishes should not be respected. If, for example, a person involved in a shidduch (marriage match) confides in a friend that he suffers from a chronic serious ailment, it is the responsibility of the friend to ensure that the other party is informed. One cannot demand confidentiality when the Torah requires him to disclose such information.

A second situation where it is clear that one must reveal a secret that has been shared with him is where one has been told by a person of his secret plan to harm someone. One cannot demand confidentiality in order to harm others.

The rule that slander cannot be justified, even for a constructive purpose, would seem to be without exception. The Chofetz Chaim, however, speculates that if one cannot bring about a given constructive result without exaggerating, then it may be acceptable. The case he cites is where one is attempting to dissolve a friendship between two children, one of whom is a bad influence upon the other. If the victim will not be influenced to end the relationship unless the evils of his friend are exaggerated, this may be permissible.

The guidelines for such an exemption are very sensitive and one cannot rely upon it without prior consultation with a competent halachic authority.

We have seen that at times reproof may be counterproductive and is therefore out of place (See Days 45, 72, 143). There are several other factors which must be considered when determining whether or not it is necessary to approach an individual privately before speaking against him.

In a case where an individual has regularly violated a given commandment, and means are being sought to encourage his repentance and to prevent others from following in his ways, the need for reproof as a first step is obvious. There is no justification for publicizing a person’s negative behavior if a meaningful discussion with him could convince him to change his ways. Even if it is obvious that the person will not respond to rebuke, failure to approach him directly before speaking about him could be misconstrued by others as insincere chanufah, flattery – an approach where the speaker deliberately exhibits tolerance in the perpetrator’s presence to gain his favor, while speaking negatively of him behind his back (See Day 58).

If, however, the person being discussed has harmed someone, and the purpose of publicizing his actions is to correct the situation, one need not fear suspicions of insincerity. In such a case, rebuke would not be a prerequisite unless there is reason to believe it will achieve results.

In the case of a prospective business or marriage partnership, where certain aspects of the subject’s history cast doubt on the correctness of the proposed relationship, rebuke would not affect matters and is therefore unnecessary. Even if the person would pledge to mend his ways, the other party would have to be warned of the possibility that he may return to his previous mode of behavior. However, one should attempt to encourage the person to inform the other party of his past, thus lessening the need for involvement of a third party.

Obviously, the requirement that one be certain of the accuracy of his information applies to all situations where loshon hora or rechilus is to be spoken for a constructive purpose. There is, however, an aspect of this requirement that does not apply in all cases.

We have seen (Days 52-54) that the Torah requires us to judge our fellow Jew favorably and refrain from concluding that he has sinned when an alternative way of explaining his behavior can be found. As noted, even when it is clear that the person has sinned, one must consider the possibility that this may have been the result of ignorance or unusual circumstances.

While the Torah does insist that we give people the benefit of the doubt, this should not be done at the expense of others. Consequently, if one has witnessed one person harming or attempting to harm another, the need for accuracy does not require an attempt at justifying the perpetrator’s motives. Even if the act is out of character it must be rectified, and one may, therefore, inform the appropriate parties.

We have seen (Day 140) that secondhand information which would ordinarily be considered rechilus may be communicated for a constructive purpose provided that it is not presented as fact. Regarding loshon hora, however, communicating secondhand information for a constructive purpose was prohibited in most cases (see Day 43).

The Chofetz Chaim explains that while achieving a positive result on the basis of firsthand information is justified even when the chances for success are minimal, secondhand information may be used only when one can assume that the intended result will almost certainly be achieved. Consequently, one may inform one party in a prospective shidduch (marriage match) or business partnership of possible major problems regarding the other party (see Day 83) on the basis of hearsay, since such information will probably be taken very seriously. For the same reason, one may warn a potential victim of impending danger on the basis of secondhand information. Conversely, one cannot publicize the alleged unethical behavior of an individual with the hope that social pressure will encourage him to change his ways or reimburse his victims; this would be permissible only when one has witness to such behavior. The effectiveness of social pressure in persuading people to change their ways is far too limited to justify relating secondhand negative information – even if it is clearly stated that the information has not been verified.

The conditions for a statement to be considered proper, constructive speech, rather than prohibited rechilus, are almost identical to those which permit communicating information that would otherwise be considered loshon hora (i.e. information that is derogatory or harmful). In fact, a study of the situations which permit rechilus l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) will reveal that virtually every case involves loshon hora as well.

As discussed above, among the reasons which permit speaking rechilus for a constructive purpose are the prevention or termination of harm, or gaining restitution for harm caused by the subject. Such statements invariably incriminate the subject, and are therefore loshon hora. Thus, for rechilus to be spoken for a constructive purpose, all conditions which permit speaking loshon hora for a constructive purpose must be met as well.

Conversely, not all motives that justify negative speech qualify as a constructive purpose to permit speaking rechilus. While one may publicize the wrongdoings of an individual if social pressure could bring about a change in his behavior, one could not do so if the victim is as yet unaware of the individual’s identity. The evils of causing animosity between the victim and villain outweigh the possibility that social pressure will yield concrete constructive results.