Author: Acquire@pos

Through the course of this sefer, the Chofetz Chaim has told us many times that there is a vast difference between knowing information firsthand and hearing it from another party. As we have discussed, if one knows firsthand that a party in a shidduch (marriage match) has a serious hidden medical problem then he is obligated to inform the other party of this. The same would apply if one party is lacking in religious observance, or if his or her home is a place of pritzus (low moral standards).

What if one knows this information from a second source? For example, Reuven heard from a friend, who has since moved out of the area, that a certain young man has a medical problem. The young man is about to become engaged to the daughter of Reuven’s neighbor. In this case, Reuven should state the situation exactly as it is: “I don’t know this for a fact, but I have heard from someone else that this young man has…. I suggest that you check it out.”

The Chofetz Chaim concludes his sefer with the following:

“The general rule is: A person must carefully ponder all his ways, especially the way in which he speaks. He should not meddle in matters between a man and his fellow unless he is certain that his facts are accurate and that his intention is constructive and not because of hatred. He should give thought to the results of his statements, that nothing contrary to halachah should come about because of them. With such care and forethought, Hashem will assist him that he should not be caught in the snare of the yetzer hara (evil inclination).

“May the Rock of Israel rescue us from mistakes and show us wonders from His Torah. Blessed is Hashem forever, Amen v’amen.”

The Chofetz Chaim now discusses dowry and material support which a prospective father-in law offers his prospective son-in-law. First he discusses a case where the shidduch (marriage match) is being considered but has not been concluded.

Suppose you know that there is no way that the father-in-law can provide what he is promising. You know this because you have heard him say that he has no intention of fulfilling his commitment. Or, you know that his financial situation is so pitiful that it would take a miracle for him to provide what he is promising. Then you would be permitted to tell this to the prospective chassan (groom) if the conditions for speaking negatively l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) have been fulfilled.

The Chofetz Chaim stresses that the father-in law’s middle-class status is not a reason to decide that he will not make good on his promise of generous financial support. As we all know, many middle-class people strain themselves to provide for their married children far above what they can actually afford. According to the conditions of toeles, negative information cannot be related unless one has determined that his assumptions are correct.

In addition, before relating such information, one must determine that these matters are important enough to the chassan that the shidduch hinges on them. Sometimes the chassan would like a large financial commitment, but he is not prepared to reject the shidduch because of it.

Also, before informing the young man of such information, one should be certain that the young man himself has been honest and straightforward with his prospective father-in-law. If he has not, then there is no reason to inform him that he is being dealt with in the same way.

All of the above applies before the couple have actually become engaged. When they are already engaged, the halachah is much more restrictive regarding offering negative information. In such a case, one would be allowed to inform the chassan that his father-in-law was deceiving him (after fulfilling all of the above conditions) only if the chassan will react by merely being on guard against deception, or by bringing his problem to a rav (rabbi). If he will react by breaking the engagement, which would be wrong to do without consulting a halachic authority, then he should not be informed.

Having informed us in strong terms what we are not permitted to relate when providing information concerning a shidduch, the Chofetz Chaim now discusses negative information which should be related. At times we must remain silent, in keeping with the commandment, “Do not go as a peddler of gossip among your people” (Vayikra 19:16), while at other times we must speak up, in keeping with the end of that same verse, “You shall not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is shed.”

If a shidduch is being considered and one is aware that either the young man or woman has a serious flaw of which the other party is unaware, then it must be reported.

For example, if either a young man or woman has a serious hidden medical problem, or is lacking in basic religious observance, these facts must be told. Of course, the conditions for speaking loshon hora l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) must be fulfilled; the speaker must be certain that the information is accurate, that he is not exaggerating the flaw in any way, and that he is reporting the information for a constructive reason and not because he has a personal interest in seeing this shidduch proposal rejected.

The Chofetz Chaim cautions us not to offer negative information about a young man’s level of Torah knowledge. There is no universal standard by which to judge someone’s Torah knowledge. If the girl’s family considers a high level of learning a priority, then there are ways by which they can determine the boy’s level without others having to come forward and offer their opinions. If they did not take these steps, then we can assume that the matter is not such a priority to them. One would, therefore, be guilty of loshon hora if he were to offer such information.

If one knows that the home of either party is one of pritzus (low moral standards), this must be reported. But, says the Chofetz Chaim, this is true only if there is a reasonable chance that the information will be taken seriously and the shidduch will be rejected. Otherwise, such information will be used after the marriage as “ammunition” when problems develop (and, assuming the information is true, they probably will develop). In such a case, reporting the information will only serve to cause rechilus to be spoken.

The Chofetz Chaim devotes the remainder of his sefer to the topic of shidduchim (marriage matches).

If we were to look at the Torah as a kind of “Manufacturer’s Manual” for how to conduct ourselves in this world in which our Creator has placed us, we would find the power of speech under a chapter entitled “Dangerous Material — Handle with Care.” In no area would this title be more appropriate than in the area of shidduchim. The information which we provide to a party who is considering someone else as a marriage partner for himself or for his child may well determine that person’s decision. Thus, such information may affect the lives of both parties for eternity. The Chofetz Chaim notes that his initial guidelines in this area are so obvious that they should not have to be stated. Nevertheless, he states them, “because of the terrible results which come [from ignoring these guidelines] — and [ignoring them] is perfectly correct to many people. Therefore, I have been forced to explain the great treachery of the baalei loshon hora in this matter. Perhaps through this, Hashem will help to remove some of the intense blindness in this area.”

The Chofetz Chaim has very strong words for those who have the practice of labeling people with derogatory descriptions which have no basis. Labeling is an easy way of showing a complete understanding of someone’s personality when in fact the assessment may be far off the mark.

The Chofetz Chaim offers the example of a young man who is intelligent, but his sincere, innocent nature makes it difficult for him to recognize the shrewd, crafty dealings of others. Or, his spiritual level places him above taking part in the exchange of jokes or verbal fencing which his cynical acquaintances seem to enjoy so much. When an inquiring party seeks information about the young man, they are told, “He’s a nice boy, but not that bright.” Naturally, the party immediately loses interest. Because of this labeling, the young man endures many rejections from potential partners.

The Chofetz Chaim has extremely harsh words for loose-tongued cynics who carelessly offer such false assessments. He applies to them the verse, “May Hashem cut off all lips of smooth talk, the tongue which speaks boastfully” (Tehillim 12:4). The Chofetz Chaim deems these individuals baalei motzi’ei shem ra, those who habitually speak slander, since they give false information about others. They are also guilty of causing others to sin, because they create the impression that to be considered “successful” one needs to demonstrate a quick wit. In fact, those who regularly engage in “quick-witted” conversation often are guilty of transgressing the laws of shmiras haloshon (guarding one’s tongue).

The best way to deal with such people, says the Chofetz Chaim, is to stay far away from them.

This segment concludes with the Chofetz Chaim cautioning us that when asked information concerning a shidduch, we are not to offer negative information about the party’s ancestors. What is important is the person, not his or her family tree.

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim teaches us an important rule concerning giving advice.

Shimon is seeking a partner with whom to start a business. He sets his eye upon Levi, who has a reputation as an aggressive, energetic businessman. Shimon does not know Levi personally, but his friend Reuven knows Levi well. In a conversation with Reuven one day, Shimon mentions his consideration of Levi as a partner.

Reuven cannot believe it! His friend Levi has been unemployed for six months and is desperately trying to earn some money. Reuven had promised to help him find a job. And now the opportunity has fallen right into his lap!

But there is something else that Reuven knows. Levi has been borrowing thousands of dollars and has yet to pay back a cent. His situation is becoming desperate, and therefore it is quite possible that he is prepared to make some risky investments to try and earn a quick, sizeable profit and pay off some of his debts. In his heart, Reuven knows the truth: he would not take Levi as a partner in his own business at the present time.

The Chofetz Chaim informs us that there is a vast difference between withholding negative information about someone and offering advice which ignores such information. In our example, if Reuven were to hear that Shimon is preparing to enter into a partnership with Levi, it might be forbidden for him to approach Shimon and inform him that he considers the partnership a risk. He has no proof that Levi is going to do business recklessly; Reuven’s concerns are based merely on his assessment of Levi’s situation. For him to discourage Shimon because of this may very well be forbidden. On the other hand, for Reuven to ignore such information and instead use his conversation with Shimon as an opportunity to encourage Shimon to enter into the partnership would be a transgression of “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Vayikra 19:14), which prohibits us from intentionally offering bad advice.

The Chofetz Chaim bemoans the fact that some people offer such advice because they are blinded by financial considerations. For example, Reuven may be one of Levi’s creditors. He wants to see Levi earn some money so that Levi will pay his debts. It is in such situations that Reuven must be honest with himself and not offer advice that he knows is not in Shimon’s best interests. The same would apply in the area of shidduchim (marriage matches) and other types of relationships.

In this segment we are introduced to Shimon, a reckless businessman with an appetite for risk — especially when the money which he is investing is not his own.

One day, Levi opens the newspaper and comes across an article about rumors concerning a lucrative business partnership between Reuven and Shimon. Levi is dismayed; Reuven is quite wealthy and Shimon is sure to make good use of his partner’s money.

There is no question, says the Chofetz Chaim, that Levi is obligated to warn Reuven of the dangers of such a partnership (provided that the conditions of toeles have been fulfilled).

This applies if the partnership has not yet been finalized. If, on the other hand, Levi learns of the partnership after it is already a reality, then the halachah is different. As we have already learned, it is forbidden to provide someone with information which would cause him to take action which is not sanctioned by halachah. Once a partnership exists, it is not a simple matter to dissolve it. Shimon may suffer a loss from the break-up and a beis din (rabbinical court) might rule that Reuven cannot dissolve the partnership without offering compensation. The fact that in the past Shimon has made some reckless deals may not be sufficient grounds for dissolution. Furthermore, in a court of law, Levi could not testify as a single witness. Even if he had a supporting witness with him, he would have to present his case before a beis din for Reuven to take action. Therefore, Levi cannot relate his concerns to Reuven if he will react by immediately dissolving the partnership.

On the other hand, if by warning Reuven the result will be that Reuven will remain in the partnership but will be on guard to make sure that his money is used wisely, then Levi should inform him.

The Chofetz Chaim also discusses a case where Shimon is not a reckless businessman, but one who has fallen on hard times. He had been successful in the past, but now has suffered some major reversals. Reuven, his prospective partner, is unaware of this, but Levi knows all about it. The Chofetz Chaim addresses Levi. “Beware, my brother,’’ he warns him. To relate such information would be, in the Chofetz Chaim’s words, “a great sin.” We are speaking where there is no evidence that Shimon’s losses had anything to do with recklessness or poor judgment. It was simply a matter of things not going his way. Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, there is every reason to believe that Hashem will now take pity on him so that he can succeed as he did in the past. Furthermore, assisting someone so that he can succeed at earning a livelihood and not have to live off community donations is actually the highest form of tzedakah (charity). And one never loses from an act of tzedakah (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 247:2).

This segment opens with a situation where a friend confronts us: “Someone used my calculator and left it on — tell me who it was!” Revealing the culprit’s identity would be rechilus. One is permitted to say, “It wasn’t me.”

However, this would not be the case where one is present at a private board meeting where the majority voted not to renew Mr. Stein’s contract as synagogue custodian. If Mr. Stein confronts one of the board members and demands to know, “Did you vote against me?” it would be forbidden to respond in any way other than to say, “The discussion at the meeting is a private matter and I am not at liberty to reveal its contents.” This applies even when one actually voted in favor of Mr. Stein and strongly disagrees with the majority decision.

The Chofetz Chaim offers us a real-life situation which often leads to rechilus.

Reuven, who sells Judaica, has received a few rare portraits by a renowned artist. Shimon passes by the store and, seeing the portraits in the window, enters Reuven’s store and negotiates a price for one of the paintings. He tells Reuven, “I left my checkbook at home. Please put this painting aside until I return this evening.” Reuven agrees.

When Shimon returns that evening, he is dismayed to learn that the painting has been sold to Levi! Reuven attempts to excuse himself. “What could I do? Levi desperately wanted that painting. I told him that I had already agreed to sell it to you, but he didn’t care. In fact, he didn’t even give me a choice in the matter. He just put the money on the table and took the painting! Perhaps, had I really tried, I could have grabbed the painting back. But I didn’t want to get into a fight with him — I’m sure you understand!”

If Reuven’s account of what transpired between Levi and himself is accurate, then he is guilty of speaking rechilus. There is nothing constructive to be gained from telling Shimon that Levi is to blame. The sale to Levi is valid; Reuven does not dispute that. Telling the details to Shimon will only serve to cause him to be angry with Levi.

The Chofetz Chaim notes that all too often in such situations, Reuven’s account is merely a cover-up for the real story: Levi has come and offered a better price, or he is a close friend of Reuven, and therefore Reuven is eager to benefit him. Reuven has not even informed Levi that he has already agreed to sell the painting. When Shimon comes along and demands an explanation, Reuven contrives a story so that Levi is blamed and Reuven appears innocent. If this is the situation, then Reuven is guilty of the more severe sin of hotza’as shem ra (slander).

The Chofetz Chaim offers one final word of caution: Sometimes, Reuven is honest and places the blame squarely on his own shoulders. “I’m sorry,” he says, “It was my fault. Someone came along with a better offer and I sold it to him without informing him that I had a verbal understanding with you.” Even then, Reuven should not reveal the identity of the purchaser, for it is possible that Shimon will harbor some ill will towards Levi, despite the fact that he was totally innocent of any wrongdoing.

This concludes the laws of rechilus. In the remaining segments, the Chofetz Chaim offers important illustrations relating to various concepts in shmiras haloshon (guarding one’s tongue).

Righteous indignation is a feeling which nearly everyone experiences at some point in time. While it stems from the sense that truth and justice are on our side, the reality may be precisely the opposite. In a dispute over money, even a businessman who carefully adheres to the Torah’s business ethics in most situations may veer off track. He might find justification for his actions and say, “Since I’ve been cheated, I will never pay the balance that I owe.”

Often, says the Chofetz Chaim, the rationalizations which lead a person to take the law into his own hands are the results of rechilus. An example is when Reuven sees Shimon overpay for an item at a particular store. Though Shimon has already purchased the item, Reuven tells him, “You know, you could have gotten that for much less at the discount outlet.” Shimon now decides to remedy the situation himself, without consulting a beis din (rabbinical court). He withholds the money which he owes the storekeeper on the theory that he is only keeping what is rightfully his own. Of course, he is wrong. As we learned in the previous segment, there are times when a beis din will not force the storekeeper to refund the amount which was overcharged. In any case, one has no right to withhold payment without the authorization of beis din.

For advice about a purchase to be considered toeless (constructive), there must be a reasonable possibility that it will serve a constructive purpose. If no constructive purpose will be achieved, then the advice can only lead to a dispute between the buyer and the storekeeper. That, in turn, may lead to the type of unilateral actions which we have described. Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, we cannot inform someone that he has been cheated if it might lead him to withhold payment or try in some other way to cause the seller unwarranted loss.

The Chofetz Chaim comments, “Many people today stumble terribly in this area, offering their opinion to others regarding their purchases. Their friends ask them whether they paid a fair price and they respond, ‘He cheated you!’ ”

As the Chofetz Chaim explains at length, these people fail to foresee the consequences of what seems like the simple observation of a concerned friend. To make matters worse, they often incite the buyer by telling him, “Give back the merchandise! Tell him you can buy it cheaper somewhere else. If you’re embarrassed to do that, send someone else to him with the merchandise. And if he won’t take it back, don’t finish paying him what you owe.”

What are the consequences of this advice?

The advisor in this story has transgressed the negative commandments: “Do not go as a peddler of gossip” (Vayikra 19:16) and “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (ibid. v.14). The Chofetz Chaim focuses on another angle: Is the advisor correct that his friend was actually cheated? Did he study the merchandise well enough to know the makings of this particular product and its market price? Might there be many variations of quality, and therefore price variations, for this product? For instance, one can buy a vacuum cleaner for $150, or for $500. If one pays $500 for a top-of-the-line model, has he been cheated? In addition, observes the Chofetz Chaim, prices can change. Perhaps a certain item has become difficult to obtain, resulting in a price increase.

In the Chofetz Chaim’s illustration, the advisor has given no consideration to these factors. Because he acted without consideration of the halachah, he has enraged the buyer without cause. In all likelihood, the buyer will see no results from his complaint to the storekeeper, and will be left feeling cheated. The resulting conflict and hatred, says the Chofetz Chaim, are rooted in comments which never should have been voiced, even if the purchaser had sought his friend’s opinion. The Chofetz Chaim cautions people to ponder these factors and the relevant laws well before speaking up in such situations. “Then Hashem will assist him that no mishap will come about through him.”

In the previous segment, the Chofetz Chaim presented a case where one would be obligated to speak rechilus for a constructive purpose. A simpleton was on the verge of making a purchase from a shrewd, dishonest storekeeper. In such cases, one would be required to inform the person not to make the purchase.

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim takes the story one step further. The purchase has already been made and the customer has been cheated. Should the observer now go and inform the buyer that he’s been “taken for a ride”? On the surface, the answer would seem to be a resounding “Yes!” Why shouldn’t we let the man know that he has been victimized so that he can demand a refund?

The answer to this is that in certain instances, the man cannot legally demand a refund. For example, the laws of ona’ah (fraud) call for a refund only when the buyer has been overcharged an amount equal to one-sixth of the item’s true value. If the amount is less than one-sixth of the item’s value, the seller cannot be forced to refund the money. (Since the amount is small and most people would not make a claim to recover it, the wronged party is assumed to have relinquished his claim to it — see Mishnah Bava Metzia 4:3). In this case, as well as other cases where Halachah does not call for a refund, it would be forbidden to tell the buyer that he had been cheated, for no constructive purpose would be served.

The Chofetz Chaim says more.

If the buyer asks us whether we think he was cheated, we are not allowed to tell him the truth, for this would cause strife and is therefore considered rechilus. To the contrary, says the Chofetz Chaim; in such a case it would be a mitzvah to praise the transaction and tell the buyer that he did well with his purchase. The Chofetz Chaim assures us that the command “Distance yourself from falsehood” (Shemos 23:7) does not apply here. As we have already explained (Day 92), preserving peace is a form of truth, while spreading animosity is equated with falsehood.

The Chofetz Chaim also points out a case where the amount which the buyer was overcharged is refundable in beis din, but nevertheless it is questionable whether the victim can be told that he was overcharged. This is where the buyer is known to have a loose tongue. He is liable to tell the storekeeper “And if you want to know how I figured out that you swindled me — it was Shimon who told me!” In this case, by informing him that he was cheated, we would be causing him to speak rechilus.

This, in fact, is a very likely possibility. In confronting the storekeeper and making his case, Reuven’s natural tendency would be to draw upon all his evidence, including the identity of his informer. Nevertheless, he would be wrong for doing so.

We know how seriously the Torah views fraud. It is seen, not as a small indiscretion, but as something which destroys the world. Nevertheless, the need to expose fraud does not grant us a license to cause another Jew to sin and to cause strife among the Jewish people.

Because it is so easy to err in the area of constructive speech, the Chofetz Chaim saw fit to offer the following illustration and expound upon it:

You are walking down a street in your city and you see Reuven about to enter a certain store. Reuven is a simpleton, a somewhat naïve fellow who is not alert to the schemes of crooked individuals. The storekeeper, on the other hand, is a shrewd fellow who has little trouble fooling people like Reuven with shoddy merchandise, inflated prices and dishonest weights.

In such a situation, says the Chofetz Chaim, you are obligated to warn Reuven not to enter the store. If he has already entered, advise him to leave as quickly as possible.

The same would apply if you see that Reuven has already agreed to a purchase in which he will be cheated. For instance, the storekeeper tells Reuven that a new jacket, which is on sale at a great price reduction, is a popular brand name. You happen to know that the item is actually a poor imitation of the brand name. Or, the storekeeper tells Reuven that the coat he is about to purchase is on sale for $400, but you know that the same coat is selling everywhere else for $315.

In such cases you must warn Reuven that he is about to be cheated. Of course, before doing so, you must fulfill the five requirements of rechilus l’toeles. Once again, these requirements are:

1. You must be certain that your information about the storekeeper is correct.

2. You may not exaggerate the storekeeper’s faults.

3. Your intent must be l’toeles, for a constructive purpose and not because you happen to dislike t his particular storekeeper.

4. You must be certain that there is no way to convince Reuven to avoid this purchase without telling him the faults of the storekeeper.

5. You will not cause the storekeeper a loss which is not permitted by Halachah (Torah law). If your warning Reuven will result in a major scandal which will force the storekeeper to leave town or close his business, then you must remain silent.

A competent halachic authority should be consulted regarding how best to prevent further fraud.

If we take a hard look at the missteps and blunders we make in life, we will find one common denominator in most of these actions: we always have support for what we do. This support helps us overcome objections or guilt by supplying an unending list of rationalizations to free us to pursue our agenda. The source of this support is the yetzer hara (evil inclination) which joins us at birth and remains a challenge, for us to overcome until our last moment on this world.

A situation in which we should be on guard, says the Chofetz Chaim, is where we know that someone has been guilty of thievery or some other form of monetary dishonesty. If the victim is someone who is close to us, then there is a strong natural urge to inform the person of what happened and to let him know the identity of the perpetrator. However, as we have learned, we can only relate such information for a constructive purpose, and only after fulfilling the necessary conditions. If the victim cannot retrieve his money and it is clear that the crime was a “one-shot deal” and will not be repeated, then to tell the victim what happened would be to commit the sin of speaking rechilus.

The Chofetz Chaim also reminds us that we cannot relate such information even when our friend, the victim, pressures us to do so. “I know exactly what happened,” he might tell us. “Just tell me who did it.” Our yetzer hara may tell us that by remaining silent we will be risking this friendship. In truth, however, a genuine friend who really cares about the other person will not allow him to become entangled in sin, even if he will be angry because of this. Friendships are based on giving and there can be no greater gift than the gift of eternity.

In a previous segment (Day 115) we listed five conditions which must be fulfilled before we can relate rechilus for a constructive purpose.

The fifth condition was that the recipient of the information will use it for a defensive purpose and not to punish the subject of the gossip with unwarranted harm. Examining this requirement further, the Chofetz Chaim says that the allowance for telling someone constructive gossip depends heavily on how the recipient of the information is likely to handle it.

The halachah requires us to take stock of this person’s mind and character. We must ask ourselves: Is this a thoughtful person who does his best to act within the guidelines of Jewish law? Or is this a hotheaded individual who will act before he thinks? If we know that this person will thoughtfully consult a rav (rabbi) or beis din (rabbinical court) on how to conduct himself in light of the new information he has received, then we can tell him the information. If, on the other hand, we suspect that he may react first and ask questions later, we are not allowed to reveal the information.

The reason why Halachah does not allow the subject of constructive rechilus to sustain undue damage relates to the laws of witnesses and testimony. When someone repeats information for a constructive purpose, he is actually acting as a single witness. But a beis din will disregard the testimony of a single witness — the Torah requires a minimum of two witnesses for testimony in court to be accepted. Therefore, a beis din would not impose damages on a defendant against whom there is only one witness. If a beis din cannot impose damages against this person, then certainly the recipient of constructive rechilus cannot do so! The consequences of someone speaking constructive rechilus cannot exceed that which would have been extracted by a beis din. The information of a single witness can, however, be used for protective purposes.

What if two people want to inform the potential victim of someone’s plans against him? After analyzing the issue, the Chofetz Chaim rules that here, too, they should not relate the information to someone who is likely to take matters into his own hands and inflict damage upon the victim. This applies even when it appears to the two witnesses that would the victim go to beis din, he would receive authorization for his actions. As the Chofetz Chaim explains, the witnesses cannot assess what beis din would have done because in all probability they are not knowledgeable enough in the relevant laws to know how beis din would have judged.

Furthermore, even if the witnesses were certain that damage was called for, the potential victim would not be permitted to take action without the witnesses testifying in beis din. By relating the information outside of beis din, the witnesses are actually aiding a sinner whom, they know, will take the law into his own hands. The question remains as to what can be done for the person who cannot be trusted to handle constructive gossip? How do we protect him from damage if the Torah prohibits us from giving him the information? The answer is that by remaining silent we are helping him, for he stands to incur greater harm if he uses the information incorrectly. To those who observe this halachah and remain silent in such a situation, the Chofetz Chaim applies the verse, “One who guards his mouth and his tongue, guards his soul from troubles” (Mishlei 21:23).

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim offers an example of a person whom you heard plotting to harm or embarrass someone. Certainly if the threat is serious then it must be reported, for there is a clear constructive purpose in warning the person. But if the person who spoke was just venting his anger with no intention of following through on his threat, then there is no constructive purpose. To the contrary, the report will only infuriate the subject and cause more animosity between him and the person who spoke against him.

To judge whether or not there is a constructive purpose in relating rechilus, one needs to carefully examine the situation and use a generous dose of common sense. The Chofetz Chaim offers some criteria for assessing the seriousness of any threats we may hear. The first is to know the person making the threat. Has he taken revenge on others in the past? Is he known to carry out his threats? Has he ever done before what he now claims he is planning to do? If after sizing up the situation the threat seems credible, then the information must be reported to the potential victim, assuming the conditions of toeles (constructive purpose) have been fulfilled.

The Chofetz Chaim cautions us that our first step should be to attempt to reprove the person who made the threat in the hope that this will convince him to retract it. If the situation can be resolved with that one step, it will not be necessary to warn the potential victim and disrupt the relationship. However, one need not reprove in a case where it seems obvious that the person will ignore reproof.

The Chofetz Chaim further cautions us that before reporting to the potential victim, one should try to assess what his reaction will be. If he will react by taking steps to protect himself, or by avoiding his attacker entirely, then he should be forewarned. But if his reaction will be to become enraged and confront the other person, resulting in a full-scale feud, then it would be best to remain silent on the matter.

In general, much common sense is required to decide when a negative comment should be repeated.

We now begin the concluding chapter of Sefer Chofetz Chaim. In his introduction to the chapter, the Chofetz Chaim writes, “In this chapter, we will explain when it is actually correct to speak rechilus, in cases where the speaker’s intention is to save the person from damage. I ask of Hashem that I should not stumble in a matter of halachah.”

If the Chofetz Chaim found it necessary to offer a prayer at this point, then surely we should handle such situations with the utmost care. We can liken this to a situation where someone faces the possibility of undergoing major surgery. The person would surely ask for a second, expert opinion before making any decisions. Likewise, when our spiritual welfare is threatened by the possibility of stumbling in matters of loshon hora and rechilus, seeking advice of a halachic authority is strongly recommended.

With these caveats, let us examine the following case:

You learn that your friend is in the process of hiring a particular contractor for repairs on his house. You know that this contractor is not to be trusted. You are familiar with cases in which he has repeatedly changed his price, used inferior material, and demanded additional money to finish the job. The Chofetz Chaim states that you must warn your friend, provided that you can fulfill the following five conditions: *

1. Do not jump to conclusions.
All of us have had the experience of having our assumptions soundly disproved upon gaining more information. Before you say something that will cause this contractor a loss of income, you must check your facts and be certain that they show the contractor to be untrustworthy.

2. Do not exaggerate.
Do not use any terms or expressions which will make the fellow appear worse than he actually is. Though you may think that you need to exaggerate so that your friend will take you seriously, it is forbidden nonetheless.

3. Be sure that your only intention is to accomplish something constructive. If you yourself had a bad experience with this contractor and you still harbor some ill will towards him, you should not be the one to tell your friend about his dishonesty. In such a case, it would be wise to seek the counsel of a rav (rabbi) to decide how your friend should be warned.

Furthermore, you must be sure that your friend will not turn the information into rechilus by repeating it to the contractor. As the Chofetz Chaim explains, if it is unlikely that your friend will heed your warning not to use the contractor, then you should not warn him. This is especially true if it is likely that when things do not go as planned, your friend will lose his temper and tell the contractor, “My friend Reuven was right in telling me not to use you!” If that happens, your friend would be guilty of speaking rechilus and you would be guilty of causing a Jew to sin.

4. Seek other alternatives.
If there is any way that you can get your friend not to use this contractor without relating the negative information, then that is what you must do. For example, you might recommend a less expensive contractor, whom your friend would probably want to use.

5. Carefully consider the impact of your words.
In our example, the result of your words should be that the contractor is not hired by this particular customer. However, if the contractor’s business might be ruined, the information cannot be shared. For instance, if your friend owned a newspaper and would publish this information in a consumer advice column, or if he might use some other means which would have a severe impact on the contractor’s livelihood, then it is forbidden to relate the information.

A competent halachic authority should be consulted regarding how best to prevent further fraud.

The wisdom of the Torah is plainly apparent in these laws. The Torah recognizes the need to warn a friend about potential harm. Yet it also encompasses an awareness that businesses and professional careers can be destroyed by mistaken assumptions or competitor’s gossip. The laws of relating rechilus for a constructive purpose are precisely designed so that we can walk the thin line between helpful information and destructive gossip.

It is forbidden to tell a person a remark which was made about him, if that remark will cause him to be even slightly upset — though it contains nothing which is actually derogatory. Relating such remarks falls under the category of avak rechilus.

As proof of this law, the Chofetz Chaim (in Be’er Mayim Chaim) cites the famous incident involving Avraham and Sarah (cited above in Day 92). When the angels, who were disguised as wayfarers, informed Avraham that in a year hence he and his wife would be blessed with a child, Sarah (who stood listening at the doorway of the tent) laughed incredulously. “After I have withered shall I again have delicate skin? And my husband [too] is old!” (Bereishis 18:12). Hashem was displeased with this response (see Ramban ad loc.) and demanded of Avraham, “Why is it that Sarah laughed, saying, ‘Shall I in truth bear a child though I have aged?’” For the sake of peace between husband and wife, Hashem did not tell Avraham that Sarah had mentioned that he, too, was old.

Let us ponder this for a moment. At the time of this incident, Avraham was ninety-nine years old. Sarah was certainly not saying something derogatory when she referred to her husband as “old.” But the relationship between husband and wife is a very delicate one. Hashem, in His infinite wisdom, determined that even someone as great as Avraham Avinu (our Forefather) might feel slightly hurt upon learning that his wife referred to him as “old.” Therefore, Hashem omitted this part of Sarah’s remark when confronting Avraham.

The Chofetz Chaim concludes this chapter by cautioning us not to reveal private information which has been told to us in confidence. While revealing secrets is not necessarily in the category of speaking rechilus, it does cause harm to the person who confided in us. Furthermore, says the Chofetz Chaim, one who reveals secrets steps beyond the bounds of tznius (privacy and modesty) and goes against the wishes of the other person, which in itself is wrong.

In this segment, we begin learning the laws of avak rechilus (the “dust” of rechilus); statements which are not actual rechilus but which are nonetheless forbidden because they may cause ill will.

The first case is where Reuven tells Shimon, “You know, the other day someone asked Levi about you and he replied, ‘Oh, I think we’re best off not discussing him.’” Such a report indicates that Levi was hinting to something negative about Shimon.

The Chofetz Chaim’s second case is where mentioning someone’s generosity might cause the listener to be upset with him. For example, Levi tells Reuven, who is Shimon’s partner in a contracting firm, “Shimon is one of the nicest people I know. While you were away on vacation, he sent one of your best workers to help me with the porch I’m building — free of charge!” Reuven may not be very happy to hear that his partner is sharing their workers with others for free. To inform Reuven of this is to speak avak rechilus.

The third case is where Reuven’s business has scored some great successes and word of this spreads. A generous fellow, Reuven extends huge loans to help some friends get started in business. But when another friend comes who has a reputation of not paying his debts, Reuven is reluctant to help him. Some time later, this friend is discussing his plight with someone who exclaims, “Reuven didn’t help you with a loan? I’m shocked! He lent me so much money when I started my business!” While the man meant no harm, he very possibly has caused his listener to be angry with Reuven. He is, therefore, guilty of speaking avak rechilus.

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim finds it necessary to once again discuss the matter of conversation between husband and wife. If someone tells a woman something derogatory about her husband, she may not repeat this to her husband. Obviously, the same would apply if someone tells a husband something negative about his wife. The consequences of not observing this halachah can be devastating. Many family battles have been started by a husband telling his wife what his mother or sister said about her, or by a wife mentioning a criticism which her parents voiced about her husband.

The Chofetz Chaim offers us an important observation: If someone willingly listens to and accepts rechilus from his wife, then he is actually sending his wife a subtle message that he is pleased when she shares such information with him. This will encourage her to report to him every time she hears something derogatory about him. Aside from the many transgressions involved with speaking and accepting rechilus, such situations ultimately lead to much distress, resentment and strife.

Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, a wise husband or wife, upon being told rechilus by his or her spouse, will make it perfectly clear that such talk is forbidden by the Torah and is not a desired, nor constructive, feature in a Jewish home.

If Shimon tells Reuven’s wife that Levi spoke negatively of Reuven, Shimon has committed an act of rechilus. Though he has not repeated the story to Reuven himself, there is no doubt that Reuven’s wife will bear animosity towards Levi for having denigrated her husband. The Chofetz Chaim expands this concept to include all relatives, based on the assumption that relatives are protective of one another, and feel personally hurt when one of their members is attacked.

In the above case, had Shimon related the information to someone outside of Reuven’s family, he would have been guilty of loshon hora, not rechilus. In Be’er Mayim Chaim, the Chofetz Chaim presents a case where one would be permitted to relate the information to non-family members. Reuven and Levi are involved in a monetary disagreement. Levi mentioned to Shimon that he was convinced that he was right and that he would win the forthcoming din Torah (court case). If Shimon were to mention this to someone outside of Reuven’s family, it would not be loshon hora (assuming that nothing derogatory was said about Reuven). However, if repeated to a member of Reuven’s family it would be rechilus, since family members are inclined to be offended by the suggestion that Reuven is wrong.

The Chofetz Chaim then presents a case of a Jew who sets a non-Jew against a Jew. For example: A non-Jew purchased an item from Aharon. David tells the non-Jew, “He overcharged you.” The non-Jew feels cheated and may come to hate Aharon. The Chofetz Chaim sees this type of rechilus as particularly dangerous because it may cause the non-Jew to seek ways to harm Aharon for having taken advantage of him.

The Chofetz Chaim states: “Some people stumble frequently in this matter. They denigrate merchandise which a non-Jew purchased from a Jew, or they find fault with the work which a Jew did for a non-Jew. This can cause the Jew harm, and often can mean the ruination of his livelihood.”

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim gives us two examples of rechilus which are at opposite extremes. The first deals with an am ha’aretz, a Jew who is woefully poor in his knowledge of Torah. The Chofetz Chaim reminds us that the primary prohibition against loshon hora and rechilus is Lo Seileich Rachil B’Amecha, You shall not go as a peddler of gossip among your people (Vayikra 19:16). An am ha’aretz, though ignorant of Torah, is certainly included in Amecha, your people. Thus, it is absolutely forbidden to speak rechilus about him.

The Chofetz Chaim then cautions us very strongly against speaking rechilus about a talmid chacham (Torah scholar). The Chofetz Chaim’s points are explained through the following illustration:

Let us imagine that Chaim tells Yosef: “Rabbi Adams told me that your honesty leaves something to be desired.” Now, as we have already learned, rechilus cannot be related even when it is true. If it is false, the sin is greater. In the case of a talmid chacham, chances are that either the speaker is not reporting the statement correctly — in other words, he’s guilty of falsehood — or that the scholar had good reason for saying what he said.

Furthermore, says the Chofetz Chaim, the Torah commands us to respect and assist Torah scholars. We should eat with them, do business with them, seek to marry our daughters to them, and cling to them in any way possible. A Jew does the opposite when he speaks rechilus concerning a talmid chacham.

Finally, people are especially hurt when they hear that a person of stature spoke badly of them. When Yosef hears that Rabbi Adams said he is dishonest, this will very possibly cause him to feel deep resentment towards the rabbi. If he had looked to the rabbi as his mentor, his religious observance might even be affected.

If Yosef is hot-tempered, the report could lead to a feud. If Rabbi Adams is the rav (rabbi) of the synagogue in which Yosef is a member, such rechilus might ultimately cause the rav to lose his position. Thus, rechilus spoken about a talmid chacham is an extremely serious matter.

The laws of rechilus apply to all Jews. There is no difference whether the speaker is a relative or stranger. And there is no difference whether the person being spoken about is an adult or a child.

Furthermore, a son or daughter who hears someone speak badly of his or her parent cannot relate this to the parent. For example, if a son hears a nasty comment about his father, he cannot tell his father about it. Though he is motivated by a desire to honor his father, he will honor him more by obeying the Torah’s command not to speak rechilus.

As we stated, it is forbidden to speak rechilus about a child. The Chofetz Chaim offers an example which shatters a common misconception:

Shimon’s son is fighting with Levi’s son in the park, and Shimon’s son has the upper hand. Reuven happens to be strolling through the park at that time. He is a good friend of Levi and he knows exactly what to do — at least, he thinks he does.

The next time Reuven meets Levi, he tells him how Shimon’s boy “was giving it” to his son. Levi is not pleased. The next time Levi sees Shimon’s son, he pulls him aside and tells him in no uncertain terms that if he ever goes near his son again he will regret it. To make it clear that “he means business,” Levi slaps the boy on both cheeks.

Shimon’s son now tells his father, who in turn is incensed at Levi. A full-scale feud erupts, and how did it all begin? With the rechilus reported by Reuven.

The Chofetz Chaim is not suggesting that we never inform a parent when his child is the victim of aggression. What he is telling us is that rechilus about children is also rechilus and therefore we need to fulfill all the conditions of toeles (constructive speech) before informing a father of such matters. In our example, Reuven must first ask himself: “Am I certain that my understanding of the incident is correct? Perhaps Levi’s son instigated the fight and teased the other boy until he felt the need to retaliate?

“What will I accomplish by telling Levi about the incident? And if there is something to accomplish, perhaps it could be done by speaking to Shimon about his son, so as to avoid speaking rechilus?” Other questions relating to the conditions of rechilus l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) need to be addressed as well.

Both in the laws of loshon hora and the laws of rechilus, the Chofetz Chaim has stressed that someone who intentionally relates negative talk without a constructive purpose is deemed a rasha (wicked individual), for he intentionally transgresses Torah prohibitions, and obviously his words cannot be believed. But what if such vremarks were not made maliciously, in the way of a gossipmonger? What if the person conveyed the information Meisiach L’fi Tumo, as a casual remark with no harm intended?

The Chofetz Chaim refers us to the laws of loshon hora (Day 62). There we learned that with regard to those laws, the principle of Meisiach L’fi Tumo carries no weight. Here, too, if someone casually — and seemingly innocently — speaks rechilus in the course of conversation, we are not permitted to believe it. If the speaker’s report could be understood in a favorable way, we are required to give the subject the benefit of the doubt.

Another concept, which we have already discussed, is Devarim Hanicarim (recognizable signs), circumstantial proof which indicates that a report is true. Here, the Chofetz Chaim enumerates the five conditions which must be met before one can accept rechilus as fact based on circumstantial proof:

1. There is no way that the information can be interpreted in a favorable way.

2. The evidence must be directly related to the report and it must be solid, not superficial.

3. The listener has firsthand knowledge of the evidence. If he heard about the evidence from someone else but did not confirm it personally, it cannot be relied upon.

4. As we have stated many times, one may listen to rechilus only for a constructive purpose. If there is no such purpose, it is forbidden to listen to the report, regardless of how convincing the evidence seems. If one heard the report accidentally, he must disregard it.

5. After meeting the above four conditions, one is permitted to accept the information as fact and act upon it constructively. However, he is not permitted to share the information with others (except for a constructive purpose) — including his wife, parents or close friends. And he certainly cannot use the information as an excuse to harm the individual in any way.

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim introduces us to a particularly deadly strain of gossip, a brand of loshon hora which is instinctively abhorrent to the average Jew. We are referring to the words of a malshin, a Jew who informs on another Jew to government authorities. While such a scenario is very rare, nevertheless, it too is covered by halachah and the Chofetz Chaim saw fit to include it in his sefer. To better understand the issue at hand, we offer a modern-day example.

A certain businessman decides to get rid of his competition the old-fashioned way — he informs on him to the IRS, the Board of Health or some other governmental body. His competitor is now in serious trouble and faces heavy fines which will consume his capital and possibly cause his business to collapse.

The victim has many problems to face. Uppermost in his mind, however, is one question: “Which one of my competitors did this to me?” He investigates a bit and discovers what, to his mind, is strong evidence pointing to one man’s guilt. He decides to give the man a “taste of his own medicine” and informs on him to the authorities.

The Chofetz Chaim explains the seriousness of his error:

“In truth, this is a complete mistake for a number of reasons:

“To inform on the other person would only be permissible if it could accomplish something constructive for the future, so that the perpetrator would not inform on him again — and would be allowed only if there was no other way to accomplish this. However, if his intention in informing on him is revenge, it is absolutely forbidden (as explained in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 388:9).

“Furthermore, to inform on the person (for a constructive purpose) would be allowed if he knows firsthand that this man is the guilty one — for example, he was actually present when the man spoke to the authorities about him. However, circumstantial evidence — even strong evidence — would not permit this. Certainly he could not inform on the alleged informer based on reports which he received from others, for he cannot even believe the reports in his heart, unless they were offered as testimony in beis din (rabbinical court)… One cannot rely on such reports to cause the person even the slightest loss …”

Even in the most difficult situations, the laws of the Torah must be upheld. Those who withstand the test and refrain from accepting rechilus in difficult circumstances will merit reward to which no earthly pleasure can compare.

In the laws of loshon hora (Day 61), we discussed a situation where the person relating the loshon
hora is Mheiman K’Brei Trei, that is, where the listener considers the speaker’s integrity beyond reproach, to the point where he considers the speaker’s words equivalent to that of two valid witnesses testifying in court. Here, the Chofetz Chaim discusses a situation of rechilus. Can we accept such a report when the person relating it is Mheiman K’Brei Trei?

Obviously, if there is no constructive purpose in relating the information, it cannot be accepted in any case. If there is a constructive purpose, and the speaker is the type of trustworthy individual whom we have described, then it would seem that the listener could accept the information as fact (as opposed to merely protecting himself in case the information is accurate). However, the Chofetz Chaim makes the following points:

For a person to have this status of Mheiman K’Brei Trei, he has to be someone whom we trust implicitly in all situations. However, says the Chofetz Chaim, “If in other matters one does not believe him that much, and the real reason for believing him here is because the listener enjoys an interesting piece of loshon hora or rechilus, then surely it is forbidden to believe him — and to the contrary, the more the listener believes him and accepts the information as fact, the more he transgresses the sin of accepting rechilus.”

The Chofetz Chaim concludes that, practically speaking, we should not rely on the license of Mheiman K’Brei Trei to accept rechilus, for a number of Rishonim (Early Commentators) maintain that it is difficult to know for sure the level of integrity that is needed for a person to have this status. The Chofetz Chaim adds, “Many people err regarding this halachah. They are careful not to speak loshon hora, and not to accept it when they hear it from the average person, but they do accept it as fact when hearing it from their father, mother or spouse…This is a total error.”

In conclusion, even when told rechilus for a constructive purpose, by someone whom you trust implicitly, act upon the information but do not accept it as fact.

Married couples often mistakenly think that passing information from one to the other is not rechilus. They assume that because their lives are so intertwined, each should know what the other knows. This, the Chofetz Chaim cautions us, is wrong: “One should not reveal this (i.e. rechilus) to others, even to members of his own household.”

A classic illustration of the dangers of rechilus between husband and wife is the tragic episode of Korach’s rebellion.

Korach was born to the tribe of Levi, and before leading his rebellion, he was considered a great
man. Yet he led a shameful challenge against the leadership of Moshe Rabbeinu (our Teacher) and in the end he, his family and his associates died a terrible death.

Our Sages (Sanhedrin 110a) inform us that it was Korach’s wife who incited him to rebel. She convinced him that Moshe had personal motives in mind (G-d forbid) in appointing his brother Aharon to the Kehunah Gedolah (High Priesthood) and in other decisions as well.

On the other hand, the wife of Ohn ben Peles convinced her husband to leave Korach’s camp, thus saving his life. To these two women our Sages apply the verse, “She who is wise among women builds her house, but the foolish one destroys it with her own hands” (Mishlei 14:1).

The story has been told of a man who discovered that his business partner of many years cheated him out of a sum of money. The man was prepared to “wage war” and break up the partnership. A friend in whom he confided convinced him: “You’ll go home and tell your wife about what he did. She’ll blast his wife while you blast him. Most probably, your partner and his wife will go on the defensive and have some of their good friends join their ranks. Soon, the feud will be the talk of the town.

“Take my advice. Sit down with your partner and, without raising your voice, try to work things out. Offer to call in an impartial mediator, if necessary.”

The man accepted the advice and was able to resolve the matter to his satisfaction. By accepting his friend’s wise advice, much rechilus, sinas chinam (baseless hatred) and strife was avoided.
(The subject of Mheiman K’Bei Trei is discussed in Day 106.)

The Chofetz Chaim continues his discussion of the prohibition against accepting rechilus as fact. In this segment, he describes a very common scenario in the business world: a case of a buyer who is seeking the lowest possible price for an item.

The story begins with a gentile who negotiates a price with a Jewish wine merchant for several barrels of wine. They conclude on a price and the gentile brings his own empty barrels to be filled by the Jew the next day. That evening, the gentile goes to another Jewish merchant and, without telling him that he had already concluded the deal with the first merchant, prices this particular product. The second merchant is a bit more anxious than the first for some business, so he offers the wine at a slightly lower price. The gentile returns to the first merchant and cancels his order.

The merchant is astounded. “But we had a deal and you even have your barrels sitting here in my house! How can you break the agreement?” The gentile, not wanting to look bad, says, ”I’ll tell you the truth. I met your competitor on the street and he asked me, ‘Why don’t you buy from me? My wine is much better than that fellow’s merchandise and besides, my prices are cheaper!’”

This is all the first merchant needs to hear. “How could he have done such a thing?” he wonders about the other merchant. “He literally took the bread out of my mouth!” Having accepted the gentile’s word as fact, the first merchant harbors great hatred towards his competitor and feels fully justified in launching an all-out-war against him. He tells himself — and his friends — that his competitor is a wicked soul and that it is a mitzvah to speak against him and run him out of business.

Meanwhile, the second merchant responds in kind and a full-scale war erupts. And how did it all begin? By accepting one report of rechilus.

The Chofetz Chaim reflects: Had the first merchant told himself the truth, that the second merchant had no idea that he had already concluded a deal with the gentile, the story could have ended so beautifully. The first merchant would fulfill the positive commandment to grant a fellow Jew the benefit of the doubt. He would avoid transgressing several negative commandments, including accepting rechilus, harboring hatred towards a fellow Jew and seeking revenge. When the second merchant would be told of what the gentile did and of his competitor’s reaction, he would tell himself that in the future he would be careful to check that the buyer has not already concluded a deal with someone else. The result of all this would be: No loshon hora, no price wars, no hatred.

The Chofetz Chaim declares that this path would bring the two merchants blessing and joy both in this world and the World to Come. He cites the verse: “Who is the man who wants life, who loves days, to see good? Guard your tongue from evil…” (Tehillim 34:13-14). The Chofetz Chaim comments: “Who is the man who wants life”— in the World to Come; “who loves days”— in this world.

By contrast, the sin of one who accepts rechilus is even greater than that of the one who speaks it.

We have been discussing the issue of accepting rechilus, a report that somebody said something negative about you or did something harmful to you. In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim deals with cases where circumstances seem to indicate that the report is true.

Sitting among a crowd at a bar mitzvah, David says, in a voice loud enough for everyone to hear, that Reuven did something which was damaging to Shimon. One might assume that since this announcement was made in public, it is probably true. Can Shimon believe David? No. Shimon has to discern if there is anything constructive to be gained from absorbing this information. If it will help him to prevent further harm, he is allowed to suspect that the information is true and he can investigate further. If the information has no relevance for the future, he should assume that it is not true.

The Chofetz Chaim then offers another case which has already been mentioned and bears repetition. You are talking to Reuven in the presence of Shimon and Reuven tells you that Shimon spoke negatively of you. Now, you know that Shimon is the type of person who is very confrontational; if someone accuses him of something of which he is innocent, he vocally defends himself. Today, on the other hand, as he hears Reuven tell you that he said something derogatory about you, he remains uncharacteristically quiet. What better proof can there be that Reuven’s report is true? The Chofetz Chaim tells us that even in this extreme case, you must dismiss Reuven’s report as false (assuming that there is no constructive purpose in according it your attention).

In previous segments, the Chofetz Chaim has offered us several possible reasons for rejecting such a report. Here, he reminds us of the most compelling one.

“Even if the report is true, Reuven is still a rasha (wicked person) for reporting it. As we have already learned, the average Jew has a chezkas kashrus; that is, he is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.”

The Chofetz Chaim then challenges us:

“Are you going to rely upon a rasha’s report to remove a fellow Jew from his chezkas kashrus and assume that he transgressed the sin of loshon hora and other related sins? Surely the speaker [Reuven], who is suspect regarding the sins of rechilus and loshon hora, is also suspect regarding lying — adding to the real story or turning the entire story around.”

As we know, when a person does something which affects us negatively, our reaction will often depend on who that person is. For example:

You arranged to get a ride home with someone after a wedding. At the end of the wedding, you search for the person but cannot find him. Someone tells you, “He left already. Did he leave you stranded?” Your reaction will depend very much on who stranded you. If it was your father or brother, then your mind will immediately view the act as innocent and you will assume that there is probably a good reason for his behavior. If, on the other hand, the person who was supposed to drive you was someone that you know only casually, you might say to yourself, “He probably realized that he had no room for me. But how could he be so inconsiderate as to not even tell me?”

Of course, there could be any number of reasons why the person left without telling you. He may have been mistakenly told that you had already left, or that you wanted to stay late. Perhaps an emergency forced him to leave in a hurry. Or, he may have simply forgotten.

The Chofetz Chaim discusses a case where you have been told that someone said something negative about you or has done something against you (i.e. you have heard rechilus) and you have confirmed that the report is true. Nevertheless, says the Chofetz Chaim, you are obligated to judge him favorably if there is any possible way to interpret his statement or action in a positive light. If you do not judge him favorably, then you are guilty of accepting rechilus.

The Chofetz Chaim concludes by discussing the teshuvah (repentance) which is required of someone who has accepted rechilus as truth:

“He must work on himself to expel the matter from his heart so that he no longer believes it. If it is difficult for him to believe that the speaker fabricated the story, then he should tell himself that perhaps the speaker added some details, or omitted a detail or some words which had been said about him; or that the person uttered his words using nuances which would give his statement a positive interpretation.”

“The listener should take upon himself not to accept loshon hora or rechilus in the future from any Jew, and he should confess his sin (before Hashem). Through this, he will have corrected his sin, provided that he did not relate the information to others.”

The following case represents an all-too-common practice: Reuven works for a company which determines salary raises for its employees through an annual salary review. Today is the day when company managers meet to discuss Reuven’s performance and decide on his coming year’s salary. Among the managers at the meeting will be Reuven’s friend, Shimon. While Shimon is not among those who make the salary decisions, he will be privy to the discussion. Therefore, Reuven considers him the perfect source for inside information on what management is saying about him. As soon as the meeting is over, Reuven finds a chance to speak privately to Shimon. “What did they say about me?” he desperately wants to know.

The desire to know what others think about us is often deeply rooted. It can begin in childhood, develop in the self-conscious adolescent, and remain an issue for many people for the rest of their lives. Whatever the context, the Chofetz Chaim informs us that a person who inquires into what others are thinking or saying about him is guilty of asking someone to speak rechilus. He writes:

“How foolish are those whose nature it is to always seek to know what others are saying about them — even when such knowledge will have absolutely no effect on their future. When people do not want to reveal this information, they are pressured intensely until they finally reveal it. The person who wanted the information accepts it — in all its derogatory detail — as truth, and he and the subject now become bitter enemies.

“If we would list all the pitfalls and transgressions with which this person has involved himself, the page could not contain them all… One who stands over his friend and pressures him to speak rechilus — so that he himself can hear it and accept it — is a chotei u’Machati, a sinner who causes others to sin.

“Therefore, one should remain far, far away from such behavior and not seek such information, unless he is certain that he needs to know it for future purposes, in order to protect himself from that person’s plans.”

In the previous segment, we learned that we are permitted to listen to rechilus—without accepting it as fact—in order to protect ourselves from possible harm. In the laws of loshon hora (Day 63), we learned about Devarim Hanicarim (recognizable signs), evidence which seems to point to an individual’s guilt. Here, the Chofetz Chaim informs us that if such evidence gives us reason to believe that someone is attempting to harm us, then we are permitted to investigate the matter even though this may force others to speak derogatorily about the person.

In Be’er Mayim Chaim, the Chofetz Chaim adds that this license is not limited to people who exhibit outright suspicious behavior. Even if someone is simply behaving in an unusual way, which could possibly mean that he is planning to cause us harm, we are allowed to inquire about him, though we may hear rechilus in the process. This applies even if no ill will was known to exist between the individual and ourselves.

Once again, the Chofetz Chaim stresses that in such cases, we are permitted to take action on the possibility that our suspicions are correct. We are not permitted to assume that our suspicions are correct. The Chofetz Chaim says more: We should not even view the matter as “50-50,” with an equal possibility of the person being innocent or guilty. The average Jew has a chezkas kashrus; that is, he is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. When we act upon our suspicions, it is only on a slight chance that there is cause for concern.

The Chofetz Chaim concludes: “Therefore, it is forbidden to do anything against the person, to cause him any sort of harm or shame, neither large nor small. Even to hate him in one’s heart is forbidden by the Torah. Certainly one has no right to free himself, because of rechilus which he hears, from any obligations which he has towards that individual. He is required to benefit that person with every good thing which the Torah commands us to provide to any Jew—for this man’s worth should not be lowered in our eyes, not in the slightest way.”

“Just as the Torah prohibits us from accepting loshon hora as fact, so too, it is forbidden to accept rechilus,” the Chofetz Chaim states. To accept rechilus is to transgress the negative commandment “Lo Sisa Shema Shav” Do not accept a false report (Shemos 23:1).

The Chofetz Chaim distinguishes between accepting rechilus as fact and listening to rechilus. It is always forbidden to accept rechilus as fact. However, we are permitted to listen to rechilus, without believing it as fact, in order to protect ourselves from possible harm or financial loss. To better understand this, let us consider an example:

Levi and Reuven work together in a law office. One day, Reuven takes Levi aside and tells him that Shimon, another attorney at the firm, has been quietly petitioning the firm’s partners to reassign to him an important case which Levi is now handling.

It would seem self-destructive for Levi not to believe Reuven. If he does not act on the information, he stands to lose a great deal of prestige and income. Aside from the loss of the case itself, Levi’s standing in the firm may be affected if his employers become convinced that he is not qualified to handle such a case. The Chofetz Chaim says that certainly Levi is allowed to listen to Reuven’s report and take measures to protect himself from loss. But he is not allowed to believe in his heart that this report is true (until his own investigations confirm the report).

However, in a case where listening to the report would not result in any constructive purpose, one would be prohibited from listening at all.

In our example, Reuven’s first sentence is enough to tell Levi that a constructive purpose would be served by his listening to what Reuven has to say. Therefore, the Torah permits him to listen and to take defensive action.

The Chofetz Chaim hints at the primary tool for rejecting necessary information as fact, while acting upon it on the suspicion that it may be true. He says that one should not believe such information “in his heart.” To avoid believing a negative report about someone else, we have to focus on the person’s merits and assume that there was no malice involved, or that the report was erroneous. To do this, one must fill his heart with ahavas Yisrael, love of one’s fellow Jew. If we abide by the mitzvah to love our fellow Jew, then our hearts become a source of compassion and understanding. Ahavas Yisrael inspires us to look for motivations which cast a different light on the situation.

In our example, perhaps the partner actually asked Shimon to take the case. Or perhaps the client requested him. Perhaps Shimon possesses certain skills which are more suited to this particular case. Or perhaps Reuven, for reasons of his own, is trying to set Levi against Shimon.

To disbelieve information which is relevant to our personal lives while acting upon the information seems like a tall order. But with a heart infused with ahavas Yisrael, one is well equipped to accomplish this task.

This brief chapter in Sefer Chofetz Chaim is a very revealing one. Earlier (Day 93), the Chofetz Chaim presented a situation where one is guilty of rechilus without telling the person any facts which he did not already know. In this chapter, the Chofetz Chaim presents other such situations. He begins with a case involving a din Torah (court case):

Yaakov leaves the beis din (rabbinical court) having lost a din Torah. While he is not pleased with the results, he does accept them and is prepared to abide by the judges’ ruling. But when he meets his friend Shimon and tells him the news, Shimon is enraged, insisting that Yaakov has been wronged and a terrible injustice has been committed by the court. Though nothing has changed regarding the actual beis din proceedings, and Yaakov still has no choice but to abide by the ruling, he is now angry with the judges, convinced that the case was totally mishandled.

Shimon is guilty of rechilus (of particular severity, since he has spoken against Torah scholars).

This same dynamic is sometimes responsible for marital problems. A wife, for example, may not be terribly bothered that her husband did not remember her birthday. But her friend might feel that she is being taken for granted, and provides her with a perspective that will make her angry with her husband. A husband may not care that his wife does not prepare elaborate dinners. But his well-meaning brother might step in and convince him that his spouse is not fulfilling her obligations as a wife.

The Chofetz Chaim offers another case:

Reuven spoke badly of Shimon in the presence of Levi and Yehudah. Levi goes and reports this to Shimon. Yehudah reasons, “There can’t be anything wrong in my telling Shimon that I was there too—he already knows about it from Levi!”

Yehudah is wrong, says the Chofetz Chaim. Shimon may have doubted Levi’s report—until Yehudah came along and reinforced it. Even if there was no reason to suspect that Shimon doubted Levi’s report, nevertheless, Yehudah’s words add credibility to Levi’s report and strengthen Shimon’s bad feelings towards Reuven. Furthermore, says the Chofetz Chaim, it may be Yehudah’s repetition of the report which causes Shimon to explode with rage and ignite a full-scale feud.

Until this point, we have dealt with what we will call “first-level rechilus,” where Reuven talks negatively about Shimon to Levi, who reports this conversation back to Shimon.

The Chofetz Chaim now discusses “second-level rechilus,” where the subject of the rechilus, in this case Shimon, goes back to Reuven and confronts him concerning the negative remarks he allegedly said. “Levi told me that you said some very nasty things about me!” With this action, Shimon himself has spoken rechilus, for by telling Reuven of Levi’s report to him, Shimon has caused Reuven to be upset with Levi.

The Chofetz Chaim laments the fact that unfortunately this form of rechilus is all too common.

The Chofetz Chaim adds that even if Shimon were not to mention Levi’s name when confronting Reuven with the report, he would be guilty of rechilus if Reuven could deduce on his own that Levi was the culprit.

Furthermore, if Shimon were to report this story not to Reuven but to Reuven’s family, he would be equally guilty. It is natural for people to take offense when they hear that negative remarks have been said about their relatives.

Finally, the Chofetz Chaim informs us that it is even rechilus for Levi to tell Yehudah that Reuven has spoken badly of Shimon. As we know all too well, such reports often find their way to the subject, and ill will is the result. In addition, says the Chofetz Chaim, to inform someone that one Jew has spoken negatively of another is to speak loshon hora.

It is all too often that a baal loshon hora ends his tirade with, “And if he were standing here, I would say it anyway!” In the laws of loshon hora, the Chofetz Chaim taught that such bravado is greatly misplaced. Here, in the laws of rechilus, the Chofetz Chaim reinforces his stand. He informs us that it is actually a greater sin to speak rechilus in the presence of the one whose comment is being repeated. For example:

Reuven has told you loshon hora about Levi. “Did you hear Levi speak at the school dinner — it was awful!” Later that day, you happen to meet Levi and Reuven on the street together. You casually remark, “Levi, I heard you spoke at the school dinner. Reuven said that it was absolutely awful.” Levi turns to Reuven who, after turning every color of the rainbow, mutters some kind of denial.

Why is this type of rechilus particularly severe? The Chofetz Chaim explains: If you report Reuven’s comment to Levi when Reuven is not present, then in Levi’s mind there is always a question of whether or not Reuven actually made the statement and whether you reported it accurately. On the other hand, if you tell Levi what Reuven said and Reuven is standing right there, there is absolutely no question in Levi’s mind that the report is true. As the Chofetz Chaim puts it, “If the report would not be completely true, then he would not have the audacity to say it in [Reuven’s] presence.”

In Day 15, the Chofetz Chaim leads us through this very type of rechilus conversation and provides another reason why it is so severe: it has the potential for transgression of an unusual amount of positive and negative Torah commandments.

In the laws of loshon hora, the Chofetz Chaim discussed the concept of “api tlasa” (before three), where a negative statement was made in the presence of three people, which is considered a public forum. Rambam states that such information may be repeated because it is certain to become publicized, and therefore repeating it will not be causing any harm. However, as the Chofetz Chaim explained at great length (Day 29-31), because there are many limitations of this license, it should not be relied upon in practice.

Here, too, the Chofetz Chaim cautions us not to rely upon the license of api tlasa with regard to rechilus. If Shimon publicly speaks badly of Reuven, it would be forbidden for Levi to make Reuven aware of this (or to relate this to anyone else as well).

The Chofetz Chaim then discusses a halachah which has wide application in our daily lives. He offers a case of a business partner who is seeking to break up a partnership and find himself a new partner, but is unsuccessful in finding someone who meets his requirements. It is forbidden to tell that partner, “You know, your partner was thinking of replacing you.” Obviously, the second partner will feel very hurt that his partner wanted to break up the partnership. Furthermore, once a seed of distrust is planted in one’s heart, it is difficult to uproot it. The second partner will worry about the stability of the partnership and will start viewing his partner’s actions by the light of, “Is he happy with me or is he about to walk out the door?” This insecurity can lead to anger, and ultimately may very well destroy the partnership.

We can easily apply this to other cases. Two friends always coordinate their work schedules so that they can vacation together. One of the friends contemplates taking a new traveling partner on his next vacation, but then changes his mind. Someone tells the other friend about his traveling partner’s original plans. Obviously he will feel hurt and rejected.

The Chofetz Chaim concludes by quoting Rambam ( Hilchos Dei’os 7:5): “One who tells his friend words which cause…harm to someone physically, or financially, or which cause him distress or fright — this is loshon hora.”

Rechilus is forbidden even when told to one person. Certainly, says the Chofetz Chaim, it is forbidden when said publicly. One might argue: “If I announce in public, ‘Chaim called Meir a fool,’ Chaim is sure to find out what I said. So obviously, I’m not afraid for Chaim to find out, and obviously I’m telling the truth.” Anyone who would put forth such an argument is overlooking a fundamental point of hilchos rechilus. As we have already learned, rechilus by definition is true information and it is forbidden even if the speaker would be unafraid to make the same statement in the subject’s presence.

The Chofetz Chaim presents a case of avak rechilus, “the dust of rechilus.” The classic case of avak rechilus is where a person makes a statement which could be interpreted either positively or negatively. A few people standing outside a shul (synagogue) are approached by a stranger. He wants to know where he can get something to eat. One member of the group says, “Why don’t you go to Levi? He always has something cooking on the stove.” The issue is whether or not this is a derogatory statement. The speaker may have meant, “Levi is always eating, so he always has food cooking” or he may have meant, “Levi always has guests, and he’s always prepared for extra company.”

In the first part of this volume (Day 29), we discussed whether or not such ambiguous statements are permissible. Here, the question is whether or not someone else may repeat this statement to Levi in the speaker’s name. The Chofetz Chaim informs us that it is surely forbidden to repeat the remark to Levi in a way which indicates that it was meant derogatorily. If it is repeated in a way which indicates that it was intended as a compliment, this would seemingly be permissible. However, if Levi is a person who tends to be suspicious of people’s motives and judges them unfavorably, then the remark should not be repeated to him even where the connotation is positive. The same would apply where there already exists some bad feeling between Levi and the person who made the remark, for here, too, it is likely that Levi will understand the remark the wrong way.

Rechilus comes in many forms. In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim examines a case which is unusual in that the listener is not being told anything which he did not already know. Consider the following:

The Finestones and the Breckers were celebrating the bar mitzvahs of their sons on the same night. They became embroiled in a dispute when both attempted to book the same catering hall. Three years later, the feud is all but forgotten. Mr. Sanders, who does not get along with the Breckers, would like to reignite the feud. So he casually remarks to Mr. Finestone, “There are so many simchas (happy occasions) being celebrated these days, I’ll bet it happens that friends try to book the same hall.” “Yes,” replies Mr. Finestone, “as a matter of fact, it happened to us a few years ago …” Mr. Sanders is guilty of speaking rechilus.

The Chofetz Chaim adds that, as with loshon hora, it is forbidden to communicate rechilus in writing.

It is also forbidden to inform a businessman that someone has spoken badly of his merchandise. Such comments are considered rechilus because obviously the businessman may feel ill will towards the person. This applies not only to merchandise, but to anyone’s personal possessions.

For example: imagine that you bought a dented, noisy old car. Your neighbor meets you and says, “Shimon saw that car of yours. He says you must have picked it up in the junkyard!” Though you know it’s dented and noisy, nevertheless, hearing such a comment about something you own stirs bad feelings inside you toward Shimon. To report such a comment is to speak rechilus.

The Chofetz Chaim has already informed us that we are not permitted to speak rechilus even when pressured to do so. In this segment, he tells us that if possible, one should evade the issue without resorting to an outright lie. However, if it is obvious that the other person will not accept such an answer, one is even permitted to lie. Our Sages teach that though “the seal of G-d is truth” and we are commanded to distance ourselves from falsehood, it is permissible to lie for the sake of peace (Yevamos 65). This is derived from the episode in the Torah where the angels (disguised as wayfarers) informed Avraham and Sarah that they would be granted a child. Sarah laughed incredulously, for how could a couple so old be granted a child? Hashem was displeased with Sarah’s laughter, and He confronted Avraham, asking, “Why did Sarah laugh, saying, ‘Can it be true that I will give birth when I am old?’” (Breishis 18:13). In fact, Sarah had also said, “… and my husband is old.” As Rashi states, Hashem altered the truth for the sake of peace, for Avraham may have felt hurt that his wife referred to him as “old.”

From this, we see the incredible importance the Torah attaches to maintaining peace within the Jewish people, whether among friends, family or communities. In instructing us to alter the truth for the sake of peace, Hashem is not asking us to transgress. Truth, from the Torah’s perspective, is more than words. Maharal explains that from the Torah’s perspective, animosity is a form of falsehood. This attitude is expressed by the Sages’ term for animosity: sinas chinam, baseless hatred. Peace itself is a form of truth, and strife is a form of falsehood. When we speak with the goal of avoiding strife, we are preserving truth and rejecting falsehood.

The Chofetz Chaim makes the crucial point that though we can lie to avoid rechilus, we may not swear for this purpose.

This segment concludes with the case where someone is seeking just one piece of information which will complete the picture. He knows that someone has spoken behind his back, he knows what was said, but he does not know who said it. To supply this piece of information would be rechilus. The same would apply if one were to relate the story without mentioning names, but the listener could deduce the identity of the culprit.

Rechilus has particular application to the business world because it is common for customers and vendors to traffic information to advance their commercial position. A vendor looking for his customer’s favor might reveal what the customer’s competitors have said about him or done to him. An employee might try to ingratiate himself to his supervisor by reporting what his fellow employees are saying about him, positioning himself as the boss’s ally and confidant.

Whatever the case, it is forbidden to speak rechilus, even if it means losing one’s job. If an employee is pressured by his supervisor to reveal rechilus and his refusal will place him under suspicion as an accomplice in the alleged “crime,” he is required to accept that consequence and remain silent. As the Chofetz Chaim notes, a Jew is required to surrender all his possessions rather than transgress a single negative commandment. To speak rechilus is as much a Torah prohibition as eating ham.

The Chofetz Chaim adds that one may certainly not speak rechilus if the consequence is embarrassment or derision. He cites the famous Talmudic passage (quoted above in Day 58) where our Sages apply the verse “And those who love Him are like the sun going forth in its strength” (Shoftim 5:31), to a person who remains silent in the face of insult.

Previously, the Chofetz Chaim declared that it is better to be considered a fool one’s entire life on this world than to be considered a fool for one moment before the King of all kings. Here, he reminds us that when suffering shame or ridicule for refusing to speak rechilus, one earns the great distinction of being called an oheiv Hashem, one who loves Hashem. Furthermore, though he is humiliated now, he is assured that ultimately he will be glorified, not diminished. Our Sages grant this assurance to anyone who bears insult in silence. Surely, says the Chofetz Chaim, this applies to someone who suffers disgrace for the sake of a mitzvah — in this case, the mitzvah of shmiras halashon.

Just as, by definition, loshon hora is derogatory or harmful information which is true, so, too, is rechilus true information which can cause ill will. If the information is false, the transgression is even more severe. The Chofetz Chaim cites a series of verses (Mishlei 6:16-19) which state that a person who causes bad feelings between friends through rechilus is deemed a rasha (wicked person) and is despicable in the eyes of Hashem.

It is a serious mistake to think that speaking rechilus to someone who is already an enemy of the subject is not forbidden. It is. Though animosity was already present, it is forbidden to deliver a report which will deepen the rift.

The Chofetz Chaim warns us concerning another misconception, that it is not a sin to reveal information when pressured to do so. Consider this scenario: Your friend the contractor has just finished renovating a kitchen for your friend the homeowner. The homeowner was not completely satisfied with the job and he told this to some friends. Now you meet the contractor, and he says, “Someone happened to mention that you were present when Levi talked about the work I did at his house. What did he have to say?” If you hesitate before responding, he might say, “What’s the matter? Is he unhappy about something?”

At this point, you are in a difficult situation. If you say, “He’s not unhappy,” you’re implying that he isn’t particularly happy, either. If you refuse to discuss it, the implication is also negative. The best strategy, if you can anticipate this type of situation, is to prepare a quick, simple answer that will preempt further conversation about that topic. You should not relate what Levi actually said, despite the pressure to do so.

The Chofetz Chaim concludes that even if one’s father or rebbi (Torah teacher) asks him, “What did so-and-so say about me?” it is forbidden to say anything negative. Responding negatively to, “Did they like my shiur (Torah lecture)?” also falls under the category of rechilus. Here, too, one must delicately and respectfully avoid an accurate response.

With this segment, we begin the second part of Sefer Chofetz Chaim, which is devoted to hilchos rechilus, the laws of gossipmongering. The Chofetz Chaim begins by citing the verse which explicitly prohibits rechilus: “Lo Seileich Rachil B’Amecha,” You shall not go as a peddler of gossip among your people (Vayikra 19:16). The Chofetz Chaim emphasizes the gravity of this sin: “It has destroyed many souls among the Jewish people.” He explains that in the Torah, this commandment is immediately followed by “You shall not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is shed.” Words of gossip, which cause ill will and hatred among Jews, have the power to destroy and defame families, friends and communities.

As proof of the damage which rechilus can cause, the Chofetz Chaim cites the case of Doeg HaAdomi. Doeg informed King Shaul that Achimelech the Kohen Gadol (High Priest) had granted refuge to David, for whom Shaul was hunting. Shaul accepted this wicked report and ordered the Kohanim of Nov killed. Such is the power of rechilus.

The Chofetz Chaim offers us a very clear picture of a rachil, a peddler of gossip. This is a person who goes from one person to the next saying, “Did you hear what Reuven said about you?” “Did you hear what Reuven did to you?” “Did you hear what Reuven wants to do to you?”

The Chofetz Chaim goes further. Even if the reported information is not inherently negative and the subject himself would freely admit to it, it is still rechilus. It is rechilus, says the Chofetz Chaim, even if the person’s words or actions were absolutely justified.

For example: Reuven has a habit of double-parking his car in congested areas. One day his doubleparking causes a major traffic jam. Shimon passes by and comments that parking in such a way is inexcusable. Someone approaches Reuven and says, “Do you know what Shimon said…?” Though Shimon’s comment may have been justified, the person who quoted Shimon in Reuven’s presence was guilty of rechilus.

The animosity which rechilus creates is what matters; the fact that the subject was correct does not erase the ill will which the report caused. Such ill will is the product of feeling attacked. It comes from finding out that someone has been talking about you. Think of your own reaction — the instant anger — that is aroused from hearing that someone has criticized your performance in some area.

The Torah recognizes the terrible destruction which strife causes within Klal Yisrael (the Jewish people). Disunity disqualifies us from receiving Hashem’s blessings. Rechilus fosters strife and creates rifts among Jews which sometimes are irreparable. The laws of shmiras haloshon are a gift from Hashem designed to preserve love and unity. Follow them and you will be a source of blessing for yourself, your loved ones and all the Jewish people.

In this segment, the Chofetz Chaim examines a case in which you are wrongly accused of something, and it is obvious that the real wrongdoer had to be either you or someone else within your circle.

Obviously, it would be forbidden to inform on the real culprit. The Chofetz Chaim tells us that the halachah does allow you to say, “I didn’t do it.” However, in cases where there are only two possible culprits and saying “I didn’t do it” automatically places the blame on the other person, other factors need to be considered in deciding the halachah (see Be’er Mayim Chaim §43).

Even where you are allowed to say, “I didn’t do it,” this response would be considered acting according to the strict letter of the law. However, it is considered praiseworthy to go beyond the letter of the law and actually accept the blame to protect the guilty party.

Obviously, the Chofetz Chaim is recommending this only for someone with the emotional strength to absorb the consequences. He is certainly not recommending that one do something which would cause him great distress or involve him in a feud. On the other hand, there are situations in which there is much to be gained by accepting the blame for someone else.

For example, suppose someone feels slighted because he was not invited to an important shul (synagogue) function which you helped organize. If you have an established, close relationship with the person, he is more likely to be forgiving of your wrongdoing than he would be toward someone else. If you accept the blame for this oversight, your friend will understand that no harm was intended, and the tension will be defused.

The Chofetz Chaim begins the laws of rechilus with some fundamental points. Good intentions do not remove a statement from the category of rechilus. If a statement can cause ill will it is forbidden, regardless of the speaker’s good intentions.

The Chofetz Chaim focuses on a common tactic used in arguments between husband and wife, child and parent or employee and employer. Often, people name a third party as supporting their opinion.

A wife tells her husband, “Even your sister agrees with me. She says I’m right.” A son tells his mother, “Even David’s mother says I’m right that boys my age should be allowed to drive.” An employee tells his boss, “You know, your friend Mr. Friedman told me that I’m worth a lot more than you’re paying me.”

Using another person’s opinion to bolster your case does not win arguments. Often it serves to infuriate the person with whom you are arguing. The employer who is underpaying his employee will not suddenly be won over to his employee’s way of thinking because his friend thinks that the man deserves a raise. The more likely response is, “What right does he have to interfere? What does he know about my business?” The mother whose son wants to drive will not suddenly change her mind based on another mother’s opinion. Her response most likely will be, “How dare she meddle in matters between myself and my child?”

Despite its ineffectiveness, people use this strategy for a simple reason. They feel that it strengthens their position by turning it into a majority opinion. The hope is that the opposing party will feel outnumbered and therefore capitulate.

But Halachah looks past the strategies to the end result, and it identifies this strategy as one that is likely to create ill will. And that is why it is forbidden.

A successful public speaker knows that proper preparation is the key to delivering a good speech. A lecturer cannot come unprepared to deliver an address and expect his thoughts to be organized and his words eloquent.

The Chofetz Chaim tells us, “Come see, my brother, how carefully one has to weigh each word [before speaking negatively l’toeles] when someone has wronged him, because when he speaks he stands in great danger of transgressing the sin of loshon hora. Clearly, it is regarding this that we can say, ‘Death and life are in the power of the tongue’ (Mishlei 18:21). If one will not consider carefully before he speaks exactly how he is going to present the matter, he will surely stumble, God forbid. For at that moment, his anger will get the better of him and it will be impossible to exercise proper caution.”

When someone, without proper forethought, tells others how someone has hurt him or is planning to hurt him, his emotions quickly override his intentions to speak only l’toeles.

Once one has decided exactly what he wants to say, he should carefully examine his presentation in the light of the seven requirements of constructive speech. He should analyze each thought. Does it contain anything inflammatory? Are there any exaggerations? One should consider possible questions which the listener might ask and how to respond. One should be prepared to respond quickly, without stumbling, for once the speaker begins to stumble, it will be hard for him to regain control of the conversation—and that is when loshon hora can begin. Furthermore, if the speaker will not prepare himself well, the listener may elicit information that should not be offered.

If these precautions seem excessive, imagine the precautions a person would take if he were working in a lab where deadly viruses are studied. That is how situations involving potential loshon hora should be treated, for as Shlomo HaMelech declared: “Death and life are in the power of the tongue.”

The tongue is an awesome weapon. It can destroy people’s lives and reputations. It can create divisions between people and tear apart entire communities.

But there are times when even gentle, respectful people have to resort to words as a weapon: in self-defense.

People sometimes inflict real harm on others — sometimes financial, sometimes physical or emotional. There are many situations where the desired course is to forego our presumed rights in a dispute or to overlook the hurt which we have suffered — for the sake of peace, and so that we may rise to the lofty levels which the Torah seeks of us. But this is by no means a blanket principle, because the Torah does not want us to become victims of exploitation or abuse.

When a strong self-defense is called for, the Torah places the weapon of words at our disposal, with careful instructions on how to use them.

The Chofetz Chaim explains:
We have learned in the previous segment that if someone has wronged me, I am forbidden to tell others of his misdeed for the constructive purpose of influencing him to correct his behavior. This is because we must assume that my true intention, at least partially, is simply to derive satisfaction from having others know of the wrong which was committed. However, says the Chofetz Chaim, I would be permitted to tell others what happened if this will help to have the wrong corrected. For example, if someone steals from me, and I can influence him to return the money by speaking to his parents or rav (rabbi) and convincing them of my case, then in most instances, the Torah will allow me to pursue that course of action.

Another example would be in the case of verbal abuse or physical harm. If someone has hurt me in such ways, and is likely to continue doing so, I can tell my story to those people who are in a position to convince the abuser to stop.

The same would apply if I were to learn that someone is planning to harm me and I can thwart his plans by speaking to the appropriate party. The words spoken in an effort to enlist help in these situations are permissible, though they denigrate the abuser. Halachah permits them in the guise of self-defense, as a shield and not a sword.

We have learned in the previous segment that if someone has been hurt by another party and he can reclaim his loss or prevent further hurt by telling others of the incident, he is permitted to do so.

The Chofetz Chaim begins this segment by stating:
“However, one must be extremely careful with this license, that none of the seven conditions mentioned above be omitted. For if he will not be extremely careful, he will easily be trapped in the snare of the yetzer hara and through this license, he will be counted among those whom the Torah considers baalei loshon hora. Because of this [danger], I will review all seven conditions with a bit of additional comment.”

The Chofetz Chaim then reviews the seven conditions:

1. One must have first-hand knowledge of the negative incident. Otherwise, says the Chofetz Chaim, one cannot be certain that the alleged perpetrator is really the guilty party! If one has second-hand negative information to relate l’toeles, he must make it clear that his words are based on hearsay.

2. One must be certain that he is interpreting the facts correctly. The Chofetz Chaim states that this is probably the most difficult condition of all (where one has been hurt personally) because people’s perceptions are usually subjective. He warns, “One never sees himself as guilty; each man thinks that his way is correct. If he stumbles in this [and speaks against someone who is, in fact, innocent], then he is guilty of hotzaas shem ra (slander), which is worse than loshon hora.”

3. If there is a chance that the culprit will heed rebuke, and it is likely that rebuke will not make matters worse, then one must first speak to the subject privately and attempt to convince him to right the wrong on his own.

4. There can be no exaggerations and no detail may be omitted if it casts the culprit in a somewhat better light. Sometimes leaving out a small positive point of the story makes the culprit appear worse than he actually is.

5. One’s intentions must be purely l’toeles, for a constructive purpose. In cases where one has a personal interest but the negative information is necessary to protect others, he should speak to a rav for guidance in how to proceed.

6. If one can effect a solution without resorting to loshon hora, he must choose that route. The Chofetz Chaim adds here that if it is possible to omit certain negative details and still accomplish the constructive purpose, then those details should be omitted.

7. One must be certain that the report will not cause the culprit any damage which is not sanctioned by halachah.

We have learned that one of the seven conditions for speaking loshon hora l’toeles (for a constructive purpose) is that the speaker first rebuke the guilty person privately in the hope that he will correct whatever it is that he has done wrong.

What if it is clear that this person will ignore any rebuke? The Chofetz Chaim informs us that in such a case, one may bypass this condition and go directly to those who he feels should know this information.

However, if this is the situation, then a new condition needs to be fulfilled. The negative information must be related in the presence of at least three people. The Chofetz Chaim explains why:

If the speaker does not rebuke the perpetrator and relates the information (l’toeles) to only one or two people, he will be defeating his purpose. He appears to be revealing the information in a secretive way so that the subject will never know of his report and will remain his friend. His listeners, therefore, will suspect him of lying, of fabricating the report to make that person look bad while keeping it a secret from him.

This is not the case when he reveals it before three people. We have already learned (Days 29-31) that a group of three or more is considered a public forum, and whatever is said in such a setting is virtually certain to become publicized. Therefore, by speaking in front of three, the person is making it clear that his intentions are pure. He knows that eventually his report will reach the ears of the subject. Nevertheless, he is relating the information for the constructive purpose which he has explained to his listeners.

The Chofetz Chaim notes that though the listeners may act upon the information, they are permitted only to consider that it might be true; they may not conclude that it is true. They must allow for the possibility that the speaker may have overlooked a critical point which would change the nature of the report significantly.

Therefore, says the Chofetz Chaim, it is forbidden for the listeners to lower their opinion of the subject without verifying the report. Once again, this may seem like a difficult approach to take, but if Hashem requires it of us, we can be sure that it is within our power to accomplish.

The concept in halachah of Mesiach L’fi Tumo accords a casual remark made in conversation the status of testimony in beis din (rabbinical court). The classic case where this rule is applied is when a man goes overseas and does not return and someone casually mentions that he saw the man’s dead body. In certain specific situations, such remarks may be used to allow the missing man’s wife to remarry. The reasoning is that since the speaker apparently had no motive in mind when making the remark, we therefore assume that it is true.

However, in reference to accepting loshon hora, the Chofetz Chaim states that this halachic principle carries no weight. If in the course of conversation someone innocently mentions some negative information, we are not permitted to believe it. If the speaker mentions a situation in which someone is seen in an unfavorable light, we are required to seek a different understanding of what may have happened, thereby judging the person favorably. In general, whenever we glean negative information from someone’s innocent comments, we are required to disregard it.

The Talmud (Bava Metzia 58b) tells us that it is worse to insult someone than to hurt him financially. The Talmud explains: “This (hurtful words) affects his very self, whereas this (monetary wrongdoing) affects only his money”; “with this (monetary wrongdoing) restitution is possible, but with this (hurtful words), restitution is not possible.”

The halachah does not use the principle of Mesiach L’fi Tumo to award someone a monetary claim based on a casual remark. It follows, then, that using such comments as the grounds for insulting someone would be all the more forbidden.