Category: Proper Speech

The Mishnah (Avos 5:20) contrasts machlokes l’sheim shamayim, a dispute for the sake of Heaven, with one that is not. The former is epitomized by the disputes of Hillel and Shammai whose differing views in matters of halacha, Jewish Law, are reverently studied and pondered generation after generation as eternal components of the Oral Law. The latter is epitomized by the dispute of Korach, whose personal feud against Moshe Rabbeinu earned him an untimely death and eternal dishonor. As the Chofetz Chaim notes in his preface to Sefer Chofetz Chaim, one whose sinful talk fuels strife transgresses the prohibition, “that he not be like Korach and his assembly” (Bamidbar 17:5, see Sanhedrin 110a).

To the Jew, intellectual disagreement in a common search for truth is an integral part of life. As a spiritual, thinking people, Jews are forever involved in discussion of ideas.

Conversely, personal bickering, jealousy, and competition are signs of immaturity and weakness. They have no place in the world of the Jew.

The difficulty, however, lies in our tendency to transform every dispute into an ideological one. Korach, too, came with a philosophy: that all Jews are equally holy, and thus there is no justification for one family, Aharon and his Kohanim descendants, to be above everyone else. The sages teach that Korach’s argument was rooted in jealousy, resulting from his having been passed over for the position of prince of his Levite family.Before embarking on an ideological campaign against others, one must ask himself: “Am I honestly promoting the cause of truth, or am I involved in a personal feud disguised as an ideological debate?”
Ideological disagreement should never lead to personal animosity. When Torah scholars disagree, their dispute is over ideals, and is never personal. When a scholar is involved in a dispute, his followers must be careful not to become involved in a matter that is not their own, and certainly should avoid character assassination and personal hatred towards his opponent.

Yet another situation where negative speech may be in order is where one is the victim of false accusation and wishes to divulge the identity of the real culprit to vindicate himself. Whether or not this is permissible depends on the nature of the crime.

If the crime is of a type that would halachically, by Jewish law, require the observer to inform either the victim or others of the culprit’s identity, he should do so.

If there is no constructive purpose in revealing the culprit’s identity other than to vindicate oneself, it would be forbidden for the accused to name the culprit. The accused should declare his innocence and refrain from incriminating anyone else.

In a situation where only two people are possible suspects, which means that a denial on the part of one is tantamount to an accusation against the other, it is permissible to deny the charges provided that the act committed was indeed improper. However, if the alleged offense was, in fact, an innocent statement or action, the accused should not deny it. Denial would implicate the other person who, in this case, is guilty of no real crime.

It is a middas chassidus (measure of piety) to accept the blame in all cases, unless revealing the identity of the guilty party serves a constructive purpose. Also, one should not accept the blame for an act which would reflect badly on the community or on observant Jews in general, as this would constitute a chilul Hashem, desecration of God’s name.

A most sensitive area of constructive speech is that of kashrus.

Raising doubts regarding the reliability of a hechsher (rabbinical endorsement) without reliable information constitutes speaking loshon hora. If one has reason to suspect that a hechsher is inferior, the matter should be discussed with a competent rav, who can offer guidance as to how one should proceed. Even if one rav suggests that a hechsher not be relied upon, this does not necessarily mean that the hechsher is definitely unreliable. It is the rav of the community who should decide the status of a hechsher for his constituents, or else direct them to a recognized posek (halachic authority) for his decision.

In a case of a questionable product manufactured by a local Orthodox Jew who assumes responsibility for his product and does not operate under a hechsher, extreme caution must be exercised before declaring the product non-kosher. Only the local rav or posek is in a position to decide the halachic status of the item, after taking all factors into consideration. Causing a Jew to close down his business is a very serious matter and preventing such a situation may even outweigh the observance of chumros (unrequired halachic stringencies) generally kept by the community.

It is permissible to warn people that a product is dangerous – that is, if the warning is truly warranted. Countless items are potentially dangerous if misused, and many processed foods are unhealthy if consumed in large quantities; in such cases, labeling the item “dangerous” is wrong. Labeling an item as unsafe is justified only if such a declaration is considered reasonable by normal standards. (See Day 43, condition 2.) Furthermore, if the information is not known firsthand, this must be mentioned when relating the information (see Day 43).

If the manufacturer is Jewish, he must be spoken to first (see Day 45). Failure to fulfill the above conditions would render the statement loshon horaas it would cause harm to the manufacturer, as well as to the consumer who will needlessly avoid the product.

It is permissible to inform friends and neighbors of a store where they can obtain items of better quality or at better prices than at the store where they usually shop.

Here too certain conditions have to be met:

One should know the information firsthand. (If one cannot verify the information firsthand, he would have to say, “I have heard, but have not verified that…” [see Day 43].) He must be certain that the quality of the other merchandise is superior (brand names are not necessarily better); where there is a significant difference in price, one must verify that the less expensive item is not inferior in quality to the more expensive one.

There must also be no suspicion that the preferred store is dealing in stolen merchandise, as Halachah(1)prohibits purchasing stolen goods.

In conveying the information, it is important not to imply that the first storekeeper is overcharging or is guilty of selling inferior products; one must convey the pertinent information without being judgmental. Furthermore, since people often view high pricing in a negative way, the information may be considered derogatory and could only be conveyed for a constructive purpose. Consequently, one may only relate the information to people who may be interested in making a purchase. Discussing the matter for the sake of making conversation might constitute loshon hora (2).

Finally, one should consider why he deems it necessary to relate the information altogether. Perhaps it would be better not to get involved and refrain from any action which would affect the storekeeper’s income.

Consumer protection is an important – but sensitive – area which allows for information to be conveyed l’toeles, for a constructive purpose.

If a storekeeper hands a customer too little change, or charges him for something he did not purchase, one must not assume that the storekeeper is dishonest or careless – we all make mistakes. If this happens often, one must bring the matter to the storekeeper’s attention and inform him that if the practice continues, one will have no choice but to inform his clientele. If the situation still does not change, one is required to warn people to count their change carefully and examine their receipts for any mistakes. It is forbidden to insinuate that the man is dishonest even if one has reason to suspect so, since it is sufficient for people to think that he is careless (or has problems with his arithmetic) for them to take the necessary precautions.

It would also be forbidden to inform hot-headed individuals who, for example, might vandalize the store in the name of justice.

An obvious case where conveying negative information is required is where a person is overheard plotting to harm someone. While we have seen that when a Jew may be in danger, even secondhand information can be related, it is imperative that one first determine that the plot is apparently serious and not a bad joke.

The condition that one first reprove the person against whom he intends to speak (see Day 45) applies only if one believes he can change the alleged plotter’s attitude. Otherwise, warning him would only induce him to modify the plot to ensure that it not be uncovered.

The remaining conditions are required here no less than in an ordinary case of constructive speech: One’s intent must be solely to avert harm (and not, for example, for the pleasure of thwarting the plotter); if an alternative exists – including not revealing the identity of the plotter – then that avenue must be pursued. Also, one must be reasonably sure that the plotter will not be caused undue harm. If the potential victim is known to be hot-tempered and can be expected to take revenge, he cannot be spoken to. Alternative means would have to be found to protect the victim without endangering the plotter. (The case of one who overhears a plotter will be discussed in greater detail in the laws of rechilus, gossipmongering.)

Unlike other cases of constructive purpose, protecting someone from possible harm is permissible even when no firsthand information is available. If one happens to hear that one Jew is plotting to harm another, it is permissible to advise the potential victim to beware of the suspected plotter. In such a case, where the suspicions are based on hearsay, the information must not be presented as fact. It should be clearly stated that the concerns stem from unconfirmed secondhand information that may or may not be true.

The Chofetz Chaim maintains that although one who fails to warn his fellow Jew of impending danger is in violation of, “Do not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is being shed,” this does not apply when one is unable to personally verify that danger does, indeed, exist. Nevertheless, it is proper to convey even secondhand information if this might spare someone harm.

The Torah commands us: “Do not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is being shed (Vayikra 19:16)”. We are obligated to spare no effort in preventing our fellow Jew from suffering physical, emotional, or monetary damage.

In a situation where a potential victim is unaware that he is being threatened, one is required to warn him even though this will reflect negatively on the person or persons responsible. Speech of this sort is not merely permissible, it is obligatory. Nevertheless, one must be certain that conditions which render speech constructive have been appropriately met (see Days 42-50).

It is permissible to speak negatively about someone who was guilty of verbal abuse, in order to comfort his victim. The pain and humiliation caused by insulting speech can be minimized by pointing out to the victim that the perpetrator lacks intelligence or discretion and that people do not take him seriously.

At a later point in time, it would be important to help the victim understand the nature and problems of the perpetrator so that he can learn how to deal with the person and prevent recurrence of such incidents.

An important area of speech which is considered constructive is that which helps to relieve someone of psychological or emotional damage caused by others.

It is permissible for anyone who is suffering emotionally or psychologically to seek appropriate help even if this involves discussions of people and events that would otherwise constitute loshon hora. If possible, names should be omitted, and only pertinent information should be shared.

The Chofetz Chaim speculates that it may be considered constructive for a person troubled by an issue to unburden himself to someone even if only to relieve himself of stress. Obviously, this applies to especially difficult situations and not to the daily vicissitudes of life.

We have seen (Days 63-66) that even when it is clear to someone that one person has wronged another financially, he may not attempt to effect justice outside the confines of halachah. This applies not only to a witness, but also to the victim himself.

If one feels that he has fallen victim to another person’s dishonesty, and after verifying the facts concludes that he has a valid claim against that person, he must not publicly speak against that person for the sake of attaining restitution. Rather, he should confront the individual privately and, if necessary, consult a rav. If possible, the name of the accused should not be mentioned.

A witness may not divulge to the victim the identity of the perpetrator, if the victim could be expected to employ halachically unacceptable tactics to retrieve his money.

If one witnessed a crime which subsequently came before abeis din, rabbinical court, and the accused was acquitted of any wrongdoing, it is forbidden to voice criticism of the beis din’s ruling. One must assume that a court comprised of Torah scholars has done its best to ascertain the facts according to the methods prescribed by halachah (i.e. testimony of two valid witnesses), and has ruled in accordance with Jewish law as detailed in Shulchan Aruch. If one was the sole witness to a crime, then his testimony is invalid, no matter how convincing are his arguments. Furthermore, one must come to terms with the reality that humans are limited in their ability to determine and carry out absolute justice, and ultimately, it is in Hashem’s power to correct social justice.

Certainly one who loses a court case cannot possibly be objective in his evaluation of the beis din’s ruling. The practice of raising questions as to the competence of the beis din, or accusing the judges of bias, is blatant hotzaas shem ra (slander).

Nevertheless, if one suspects that the ruling was the result of an error in the legal process, he could seek the advice of a rabbinic authority and ask that he investigate the matter.

We have seen that it is permissible for a beis din, rabbinical court, to use certain forms of social pressure to persuade an individual to abide by its ruling. However, it is forbidden to use social pressure in order to bypass the court process and force a thief to return what he stole. It is wrong to cause the community to take a stand in a monetary issue on the basis of an individual’s word alone; only through the psak (ruling) of a beis din may the community take a stand. Thus, it is correct to ensure that the parties come before a beis din, but it is forbidden to personally orchestrate the enforcement of what one believes to be justice.

The Torah requires that monetary disputes be adjudicated by a beis din, rabbinical court. It is permissible to exert social pressure on an individual to convince him to agree to participate in a din Torah (court case) before a beis din. However, social pressure that could cause embarrassment is not an option if the person is in the category of amisecha, your fellow (see Day 55). A person who erroneously believes that he is justified in taking someone else’s money must be set straight, but he is not a mumar (rebellious sinner). Embarrassment is not a recourse, but one may discuss the matter with anyone who can influence the person and explain that the person is involved in a monetary dispute and should be persuaded to come before a beis din.

Unlike an individual, a beis din may publicize the fact that an individual refuses to abide by its ruling or has ignored a summons to appear before it. As previously mentioned, social pressure is often the only means by which rabbinical courts can enforce their decision.

The second category of constructive purpose is to help those who are being (or have been) adversely affected by the subject’s behavior.

If one has personally witnessed a Jew causing monetary damage to another, to ensure that the victim will be compensated is a constructive purpose. It would therefore be permissible to relate what has transpired. After ascertaining that the facts are correct, and after having spoken with the perpetrator, one must determine what will result from relating the information and whether or not halachah justifies effecting that result.

In a civilized society, the straightforward way of dealing with crime is to inform the authorities. However, reporting one’s fellow Jew to secular officials may result in his facing punishment undeserved according to Torah. Imprisonment, for example, is not an acceptable means of punishment for monetary infractions, by Torah standards. Providing information that might lead to a Jew’s imprisonment could therefore constitute malshinus (the act of being a malshin, informer). Only if it is clear that an individual is dangerous and poses a threat to others can he be spoken against for the sake of protecting others from harm. Such matters are extremely sensitive and complex, and demand consultation with a competent halachic authority.

Finally, a teacher must be careful not to cause his student undue harm. Halachah permits a teacher to strike a child for educational purposes, and embarrassment may also be justified, if it is for the student’s benefit. (The Talmud states that striking one’s older child is prohibited as it may incite him to hit back.) However, in today’s era of brazenness, corporal punishment even in early childhood often teaches violence rather than discipline, and must be carefully evaluated. Verbal abuse by a teacher can have a decidedly negative effect on his students and may undermine all efforts at educating the students regarding Shmiras Haloshon.

In any situation where embarrassment or physical punishment might result from the teacher relating the student’s problem to others, he may do so only if the consequences are necessary for the student’s growth and development. As mentioned above (Day 26), teachers must also bear in mind the long-term effects of relating or recording negative information about a student.

If after giving a situation much thought, a teacher comes to the conclusion that a particular student has a behavioral or learning problem and feels that it will not be possible to deal with the problem without the involvement of the principal, his colleagues, or the student’s parents, then the teacher should speak to the necessary party without delay.

Condition 5 of constructive speech (see Day 50) is that the speaker’s intent be purely for constructive reasons and not out of anger or frustration. This could be extremely trying when the student in question is disruptive and frequently upsets the teacher.

Difficult as it is, teachers must not take students’ behavior personally. The disruptive student is, in most cases, not fighting the teacher; he is struggling with himself as he deals with the challenges of life.

The dedicated teacher often finds it necessary to discuss the progress and difficulties of students with parents, colleagues and principals. A lack of clear guidelines with regard to loshon hora(2) can create either a free-for-all atmosphere, where people talk about anyone with anyone, or, at the other extreme, a simplistic approach to Shmiras Haloshon(3) which could inhibit the teacher’s effectiveness as an educator.

Generally speaking, the area of chinuch (child education and upbringing) constitutes a constructive purpose which would permit relating negative information concerning a student. However, the specific conditions which permit speaking negatively for a constructive purpose must never be overlooked.

Verification of facts is crucial. For a teacher to play amateur psychologist and hastily diagnose the student as having some complex disability or disorder without pursuing the matter properly constitutes recklessness – and the consequences can be devastating. To communicate one’s evaluation under such circumstances would be hotzaas shem ra (slander). It is an unfortunate fact that certain problematic children have not succeeded only as a result of having been misunderstood by a teacher, whose labeling tainted the image of that student in the eyes of all his future teachers.

A teacher must make every effort to fully understand the behavior of each student; he must not be swift to condemn. It is essential that a student feel comfortable about expressing his true feelings to his teacher (in a respectable manner, of course). Conditions 1-4 of constructive speech (see Day 50) necessitate a good heart-to-heart talk with the student before reporting a problem (unless one suspects that serious danger may be imminent).

Helping one’s fellow to improve his character also falls within the realm of toeles, constructive purpose. If an acquaintance requires character refinement, then the mitzvah to reprove one’s fellow Jew requires one to bring the matter to that person’s attention with care and sensitivity. However, if one feels incapable of offering reproof and knows that others are also aware of this person’s character deficiencies, he is permitted to discuss the matter with them and seek their advice or involvement, if necessary. Though we have seen that it is lowly and forbidden to speak negatively of someone even with those who are already aware of the information, constructive speech is not at all lowly.

Should one find it necessary to consult with someone who is unaware of this person’s deficiencies for guidance in how to approach the person, he may do so, for this too constitutes constructive speech. However, if it is possible to discuss the issue without mentioning names, then this course must be followed.We have already seen (Day 53) that if one seeks the active involvement of someone who is unaware of the situation, that individual would have to investigate the matter personally and verify the facts before taking definitive action.

Even where it is permissible to speak negatively for a constructive purpose, one must avoid insincere flattery. It is forbidden to be critical of someone when he is not present, yet demonstrate approval of his behavior in his presence. If the concern is that the person’s feelings not be hurt, then the solution is to express respect and concern for him as a person, but clear disapproval of his behavior.

If one is certain that reproof will be ignored, and is therefore prepared to publicize the person’s behavior as an attempt to induce him to change his ways, one must nevertheless approach the sinner first, so as not to be suspected of insincerity.

In the above case, where it is clear that the person will not be moved by rebuke, one can remove the need for first speaking to him by dispelling any possible suspicions concerning one’s own sincerity. For example, if one speaks against the perpetrator in public (in the presence of three) rather than speaking to individual members of the community in private, it becomes clear to all that the speaker could not be attempting to gain favor with the perpetrator by showing acceptance of his behavior. Similarly, if the speaker is known to be zealous and outspoken and would not be suspected of flattery, he could resort to private discussion. Also, if it is clear to all that the perpetrator is a difficult personality, and publicly criticizing his behavior could be dangerous, then one may speak against him in private without fear of personal suspicion.

Based on the rules we have just studied, the rules of loshon hora vis-a-vis the totally non-observant Jew become clear.

(1) The average non-observant Jew today has been deprived of a meaningful Jewish education. Whether or not he has been exposed to Orthodox Jewish life, society has prevented him from taking Torah seriously. Rambam compares such a person to a tinok shenishbah, a kidnapped Jewish child whose kidnappers reared him with non-Torah ideals, and whose transgressions are committed out of ignorance. Such a person may be in the category of both amecha, your people and amiso, hisfellow. It is our obligation to educate him with love, care, and sensitivity and it is strictly forbidden to speak loshon hora against him.

(2) A non-observant Jew who did receive a meaningful Jewish education, has been taught Torah values and knows that what he is doing is wrong, but claims that observance is too difficult, is a rebel due totemptation. He is considered part of amecha, your people, which means that loshon hora may be spoken of him only if it is for a constructive purpose. However, he is not considered amisecha, your fellow, and consequently the prohibition of onaas devarim, causing hurt through the spoken word (Vayikra 25:17), will not apply in his case. Social pressure may be used to encourage observance even if he will suffer embarrassment in the process, provided that all the conditions of constructive speech are met. Non-constructive speech that is either derogatory or harmful would constitute loshon hora.

(3) The classic apikores (heretic) who is knowledgeable but rebels is considered neither your brother nor a part of your people. If there exists such a person today, one may speak abouthim without any preconditions.

Traditionally, Jewish communities have used social pressure in dealing with the publicly observant whose private behavior includes blatant violation of basic halachah.

If all else fails, it is permissible to publicize the fact that an otherwise observant Jew is guilty of immorality on a regular basis, if the disclosure will prompt him to repent.

Similarly, rabbinical courts have the authority to post signs informing the public of someone’s refusal (siruv) to comply with a court ruling. Social pressure is often the only means through which rabbinical courts can enforce their decisions.

A mumor l’tayovon (lit., rebel due to temptation) is someone who regularly submits to temptation in violating a specific mitzvah. While the prohibition against gossip mongering does apply with regard to speaking about him (as he is not a heretic), his situation differs drastically from one who occasionally transgresses a given mitzvah but basically is committed to its observance.

As we have learned, the primary prohibition against speaking loshon hora is lo saylaych rachil b’amecha, Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people (Vayikra 19:16). One who embarrasses his fellow Jew transgresses the prohibition lo sonu ish es amiso, A man shall not aggrieve his fellow (Vayikra 25:17).Our Sages interpret the term amecha, your people, in the first prohibition as excluding only a mumor l’hachis, (lit., rebel whose intent is to spite), one whose lack of regard for a given prohibition causes him to regularly transgress it. However, the term, amiso, his fellow, in the second prohibition, excludes even the mumor l’tayovon. Thus, it is forbidden to speak loshon hora about a mumor l’tayovon but it is permissible to exert social pressure on him in order to induce him to mend his sinful way.

It is permissible to publicize that a Jew regularly violates a particular halachah if it is clear that he is aware of the halachah and has chosen to ignore it, and it stands to reason that publicizing his behavior will induce him to change. This applies even if he transgresses the law out of temptation. However, one must be certain that all the conditions of toeles, constructive speech, including purity of intent and lack on an alternative, apply.

In the case of a habitual sinner who ignores a particular commandment altogether, one is to assume that even a questionable act is, in fact, a transgression of that commandment. “Judge your fellow favorably” demands fairness, not naiveté.

Having concluded that the person did transgress, one must then seek to understand why he frequently commits this sin. It may be due to ignorance – he may be totally unaware that the act is forbidden, or he might not realize the severity of the prohibition. Should this be the case, one must find some way of enlightening the person without hurting his feelings. Discussing his behavior with others constitutes speaking loshon hora. (This situation is common among those who were raised in communities where there is widespread violation of certain laws. In such instances, people mistakenly view those who observe these laws as machmirim, individuals who are stringent beyond the letter of the law.)

If a person whose actions may have involved a given transgression is known to commit that particular sin at least occasionally, then the commandment, “Judge your fellow favorably,” does not require that one seek a positive explanation for what he did. However, it is meritorious to give the person the benefit of the doubt and assume that this time he did not sin. Reproof would not be necessary.

If it is absolutely clear that the person did commit a sin, then the mitzvah to reprove does apply and one should, in a respectful and caring manner, help the person to overcome his evil inclination by offering reproof.

There are times when it would be more effective for someone else, such as a close friend or rav, to reprove the individual. Theoretically, it should be permissible for the one who witnessed the transgression to inform the friend or rav of it and ask that he handle the situation. However, we have learned that one may not act on hearsay, which would mean that one cannot possibly offer reproof unless he personally witnessed the transgression. Consequently, it would be one’s responsibility to find an effective means of reproving himself, or to ask the rav to either personally investigate the situation or tactfully discuss the matter with that individual without making accusations.

Before assuming that a person’s actions merit tochachah, reproof, one must be absolutely certain that he has, in fact, sinned.

From the command B’Tzedek Tishpot Amisechah, Judge your fellow favorably (Vayikra19:15), we learn that if a person appears to be committing a transgression which is totally out of character for him, we are to seek to understand what transpired in a positive light. If there is any way to interpret his actions as not involving transgression, we are required to do so.

If it is absolutely clear that the person did sin in a manner which is out of character for him, then we must assume that he immediately regretted his actions, and has already repented. To discuss the incident with anyone constitutes speaking loshon hora.

The first category of constructive purpose is to help the person about whom one is speaking. There is a tendency among many to ignore the misconduct of others in favor of a “live and let live” attitude. Let us first understand why the Torah rejects this attitude.

Every person is born with character flaws. It is our mission in life to change, to grow, to strive for perfection and spirituality. We all want to rid ourselves of our imperfections; people dowant to be good. What makes life so challenging is that negative character traits are blinding. We either lose sight of what our goals should be or rationalize to the point that we simply cannot differentiate between right and wrong.

One of the greatest gifts Hashem has blessed us with is companionship: friends, family, people around us who are close enough to care, yet distant enough to be objective. To abstain from speaking up and offering one another reproof and guidance amounts to depriving one another of one of the most valuable tools for personal growth. We must get involved and, when necessary, even enlist the involvement of others in helping people through the struggles of life. Remaining silent when reproof is called for is not Shmiras Haloshon, it is depriving one’s fellow of his lifeline to self-improvement.

It is permissible to speak negatively about a person:

1. to help the person, or
2. to help anyone victimized by the person, or
3. to resolve major disputes, or
4. to enable others to learn from the mistakes of that person, provided that:

1. one’s remarks are based on first-hand information and careful investigation, and
2. it is apparent that this person is wrong, and
3. the person has been spoken to but refuses to change his behavior, and
4. the statement to be made will be true and accurate, and
5. the intent of the speaker is for a constructive purpose only (and there is a reasonable chance that the intended goal will be accomplished), and
6. there is no alternative means by which to bring about the intended result, and
7. no undue harm will be caused by the statement.The illustrations presented below (as well as those to be discussed in the section on rechilus [gossip]) serve to clarify the application of these conditions.

Condition #7:

As noted above, the permissibility of speaking negatively for a constructive purpose is based upon the principle that it is not lowly to relate negative information for a positive reason.

This applies only to information which is derogatory but harmless. However, it is forbidden to relate harmful information for a constructive purpose. The only exception to this rule is where one has determined that halachah allows for the subject to be harmed in that manner.

Condition #6:

Having ascertained that:
1) The negative information is accurate,
2) The perpetrator was not justified,
3) Reproof has proven unsuccessful,
4) There are no other options,
5) The information will be related accurately:

Two more conditions must still be met before the information can be conveyed.

The speaker must be certain that his sole intent is l’toeles, for a constructive purpose. If he knows that in his heart he is pleased to cast the perpetrator in a bad light, he is not permitted to speak – even though the purpose cannot be accomplished any other way.

It is lowly to enjoy speaking negatively – even for a constructive purpose.

This is especially challenging when one is required to speak about a person whom he does not like. It is necessary to first eradicate any negative feelings towards that person; only then can the negative information be related.

Condition #5:

While derogatory information may be related for a constructive purpose, slander cannot be justified. One does not have the right to exaggerate or alter facts for a constructive purpose, nor may one omit details that minimize the severity of the person’s actions.

Indiscriminate use of superlatives such as “very” can easily distort facts way out of proportion. This is, in fact, a most common form of slander that people engage in, albeit unwittingly. Conversely, one must omit authentic details that make the story sound even worse if the result can be attained without their being mentioned.

Condition #4:

If, in addition to personal reproof, any other option exists that could preclude the necessity to speak negatively of someone, it must be pursued. Negative speech, even for a constructive purpose, is lowly if it can be avoided.

In the same vein, when speaking negatively is necessary, one must carefully calculate just how much must be related in order to achieve the desired result. To relate any unnecessary negative information would be to speak loshon hora.

Furthermore, even if it is clear that someone must be made aware of certain derogatory information about another person, one should choose the least blatant means by which to communicate that information. Directing someone to where he will become aware of information on his own is preferable to expressing it verbally.

In comparing two candidates for a position, stressing the strengths of one is often sufficient without actually articulating what the other lacks. In all cases, the least negative course is the one to follow.

Condition #3:

Before speaking about a person with others, one must first discuss the issue with that person himself. Trying to persuade the sinner to change his ways is a course which must be pursued before bringing anyone else into the picture. (This would not apply if speaking to the sinner might make it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the desired result through any other means.)

Before relating negative information l’toeles, for a constructive purpose, one must carefully consider whether or not his words will, in fact, bring about the desired result. Speaking negatively l’toeles is justified only if there is a reasonable chance that the desired result will be accomplished.

This point is of particular importance when one seeks to discourage a potentially harmful friendship, business association or shidduch (marriage match). Often, a final decision has already been made, and speaking negatively of the other party will serve no constructive purpose.

The fact that a situation falls under one of the previously listed categories does not necessarily mean that discussing it constitutes constructive speech. No less than 7 conditions must be met before a critical statement about an individual may be said.

Condition #1: The first set of conditions deals with verification of facts. It is absolutely forbidden to make any critical statement about a person on the basis of information obtained through hearsay. Only through first-hand information may one assume that a Jew’s character or behavior is wanting. An exception would be where one seeks to protect someone from potential harm; such instances would permit one to pass on second-hand information. This will be discussed later.

Condition #2: Even if one has witnessed seemingly unacceptable behavior, he must not hastily pass judgement on what has occurred. An incident taken out of context can be terribly misleading, both as a reflection on an individual’s character as well as in determining who is right in a dispute between parties. Circumstances must be carefully investigated before one can be sure that he understands a situation correctly. Above all, before concluding that a person has, in fact, transgressed Jewish law, one must be knowledgeable of the relevant halachos.

The most common constructive purposes which justify speaking negatively about a person fall under four categories:

1) To help the person about whom one is speaking (e.g. to discuss a person’s faults with someone else in order to help the person improve).

2) To help those who are being adversely affected by the person’s behavior:

a) Providing help for people physically, psychologically or financially victimized by him;

b) Protecting people from falling victim to his behavior in the future—including warning the unsuspecting who are seriously considering entering into an unhealthy social or business relationship with him.

3) To help put an end to a dispute in which the person is involved and which threatens to divide the community.

4) To help others learn from the person’s mistakes.

Based on the rule that one must endure social and financial loss rather than speak loshon hora, it would seem that there should be no halachic justification to speak loshon hora for a constructive purpose (l’toeles). Why then does the halachah permit constructive statements to be made?

We have noted that all forms of loshon hora fall under one of two categories:
1) Derogatory statements;
2) Statements which have the potential to cause the subject harm.

Derogatory speech was explained as being lowly in that the speaker focuses on the negative aspects of someone’s character or behavior.

There are times when discussing someone’s shortcomings is clearly constructive, and the responsible thing to do. This is true either: when one is attempting to assist the person he is speaking about, or when he is trying to protect others from that person. In such cases, though negative traits or actions are being mentioned, the statements made do not constitute loshon hora. Destructive speech is loshon hora; constructive speech is not. Similarly, there is no such thing as “constructive rechilus” (gossip); a statement can be classified as rechilus only if it is destructive.

Nevertheless, the Chofetz Chaim refers to derogatory statements made for a constructive purpose as “loshon hora l’toeles” seemingly for lack of a better term. We, too, have made use of the term “loshon hora (or rechilus) for a constructive purpose” at various points in this work.

A great deal of sensitivity, objectivity, and knowledge of halachah is required in order to distinguish between genuine constructive speech and what amounts to nothing more than rationalized loshon hora.

The Chofetz Chaim lists several conditions necessary for a statement to be deemed one of toeles, constructive purpose, as opposed to loshon hora. The conditions for a statement to qualify as constructive—soon to be discussed here—must be studied carefully before taking the liberty of making a statement that would otherwise be considered loshon hora. It would also be wise to discuss the matter with a competent rav, as an incorrect decision could result in irreparable harm.

We have seen that one must be prepared to make sacrifices so that the laws of forbidden speech not be violated.

In the world of business, when one’s product is maligned by competitors, the natural and predictable reaction is to respond in kind. Such is not the way of the Torah. There is no basis for the notion that one who has been the object of loshon hora can respond with a counter-offensive of defamation.

As with any Torah prohibition, one cannot justify speaking loshon hora on the basis of personal need or practicality. A Jew must be prepared to forego his comfort, social status, and even livelihood rather than transgress Torah Law. Needless to say, it is forbidden to speak loshon hora to gain popularity or win friendship.

One must not succumb to social pressure and engage in gossip, in the same way that one would not compromise his kashrus standards due to social pressure.

It is forbidden to comply with an employer’s demand that one reveal information which is loshon hora — even if such failure means the loss of one’s job.

Similarly, the commandment to honor one’s father and mother does not justify speaking loshon hora. One must respectfully refuse a parent’s request that derogatory or harmful information be related.

The primary prohibition against speaking loshon hora is: Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people (Vayikra 19:16). However, the Chofetz Chaim demonstrates that this sin can involve the transgression of numerous positive and negative commandments. The baal loshon hora, habitual speaker of loshon hora, can easily accumulate a multitude of transgressions at a rate unparalleled by any other sin. That is why the Sages say that speaking loshon hora is worse than even the most severe sins.

Furthermore, it is virtually impossible for the habitual speaker to ask forgiveness of everyone who was affected by his sinful speech; thus, he will find it difficult if not impossible to achieve full repentance for his sins.

The Sages caution us to avoid associating with a baal loshon hora, and not to live in the vicinity of such people.

Below we will see that in certain situations one may – and sometimes must – provide people with negative information that is important for them to know, either to avoid being harmed or for some other constructive purpose.

Whenever faced with such a situation, one must explain why he is saying something that would ordinarily be prohibited, so that the listener understands that the prohibitions regarding loshon hora are not being transgressed. To say anything that the listener thinks is loshon hora when, in fact, it is not, constitutes speaking avak loshon hora 1.

There is a form of avak loshon hora that can result from one’s keeping the laws of forbidden speech. If one says that he is reluctant to discuss a particular individual so as to avoid speaking loshon hora, he is, in effect, communicating that he knows something negative about that person.

“I’d rather not discuss So-and-so,” is avak loshon hora.

When faced with such a situation, a person must either attempt to divert the conversation to another topic or indicate that he does not know any pertinent information about the person under discussion.

Praising a person in a situation where someone present is likely to temper such praise with criticism is another form of avak loshon hora. It is forbidden to praise in the presence of anyone who is known to dislike him, as it is common for such people to respond by mentioning the person’s shortcomings.

Therefore, it is wrong to praise someone in the presence of a large group of people, since there is a reasonable chance that at least one person in the group dislikes him.

Likewise, it is forbidden to praise a businessman in the presence of his competitors even if they claim to harbor no ill will towards him.

Excessive praise should always be avoided for it can often cause people to respond negatively even when they have no particular dislike for the person being discussed.

Praise which has absolutely no negative connotations can, at times, fall under the category of avak loshon hora. It is forbidden to publicize a person’s hospitality or generosity if this will cause the insincere and undeserving to take advantage of the person, causing him monetary loss and emotional discomfort.

There are times when a speaker makes a positive statement about a person and intends it as such, but negative and harmful information can be inferred from his words. The Torah would not consider one who does this to be a holech rachil, peddler of gossip, since both his intent and his words are clearly sincere and positive.

Rabbinically, however, this too is prohibited, under a category referred to as avak loshon hora, the “dust” of loshon hora, which is spread by way of carelessness.

A common form of avak loshon hora is where one sincerely praises another person, but in doing so, alludes to a shortcoming of that individual.

“Who would have believed that he would have come this far?” clearly suggests something negative about the person. Such a statement can cause the person embarrassment when said in his presence, and can be harmful to him even when he is not present. Hence, it is forbidden.

It is forbidden to relate a story for entertainment purposes only, if it contains derogatory or harmful information.

To relate an amusing incident that would cause embarrassment to any of the people involved if told in their presence constitutes speaking loshon hora. Many a humorous situation is actually quite painful to the person involved.

All forms of loshon hora are prohibited even when the information is true and accurate. (Only in very specific circumstances is it permissible to say something that would otherwise be considered loshon hora; this will be discussed later.)

Slander, which is information that is not true, referred to as hotzaas shem ra (lit., spreading a bad name), is worse than loshon hora which is derogatory but true.

To relate derogatory information that is essentially true but includes either exaggerations or even slight altering of facts is also considered hotzaas shem ra.

All forms of loshon hora are prohibited even when no names are mentioned, if it will be possible for people to determine who is being discussed.

Furthermore, if names are omitted but the story will reflect badly on an entire group of people, it may not be spoken. Speaking critically about an unnamed student at a yeshiva is often taken as a statement about the entire student body or as a reflection on yeshiva students in general. If this is the implication, the statement is a more serious form of loshon hora, for it reflects on a multitude of Jews.

Having concluded our discussion of the two basic categories of loshon hora (derogatory or harmful information), it is important to note several rules that apply equally to both:

Loshon hora is not limited to speech. Included in this prohibition is communication of derogatory or harmful information through any means. Therefore, writing loshon hora, or using code, sign or body language (e.g. a cynical smile or rolling one’s eyes upward in exasperation) that communicates something negative or harmful is forbidden.

To show others a letter or article that would reflect badly on its author is forbidden, as is revealing the identity of the author of a work that is known to be of poor quality.

It is also forbidden to show photographs of people which they would find embarrassing.

A person who has caused harm to his fellow must ask forgiveness even if the victim is unaware that he has been harmed.

A case in point is where an employee was being considered for promotion but was never informed of this possibility. If someone violated the laws of loshon hora and made a statement to the employer which resulted in the promotion not being granted, he must approach the victim, explain what has happened, and beg forgiveness.

However, Rabbi Yisrael Salanter is reported to have held that if relating the incident to the victim would cause him anguish, one would have to forego that aspect of the teshuvah process.

If one has uttered a potentially harmful statement about someone, he has committed a sin that is both bein adam la’Makom, between man and Hashem, and bein adam la’chaveiro, between man and his fellow. Confession, regret and resolution for the future can only serve as teshuvah (repentance) for one’s sins before Hashem. For sins against man, one must approach the person and beg forgiveness.

This only applies to a situation where one’s speech has already caused damage. If a potentially damaging statement was made but no actual harm has resulted as of yet, it is the speaker’s responsibility to do his best to prevent this from happening.

A practical way of accomplishing this would be to approach anyone who has heard the harmful information, and explain that it was inaccurate.

It is forbidden to speak loshon hora about children. While most people understand that “kids are kids” and the Torah does not hold children responsible for their actions, if one speaks about a child in a manner that either the speaker or listener sees as derogatory, then the laws of shmiras haloshon have been violated.

It is also forbidden to say or write something about a child that potentially could prove harmful to him.

A teacher who is prepared to enter a negative comment on a student’s record should pause to contemplate the effect that entry might have on the student’s future educational and employment opportunities.

Likewise, teachers should exercise caution and fairness when conveying their feelings concerning a student to his teacher for the coming year.

We have seen that it is permissible to speak disparagingly concerning a rasha, wicked individual.

With regard to potentially harmful speech, it is obvious that one may not say anything that could cause physical, financial or psychological harm to any person unless the Torah permits harming him. Just as it is forbidden to steal from a sinner, so too it is forbidden to speak about him in a way that could cause him financial loss.

We have seen that it is forbidden to speak in a derogatory manner even if the information being conveyed was already known to the listener. This is because the act of speaking negatively is inherently wrong.

Conversely, it stands to reason that a non-derogatory but potentially harmful statement can be made in the presence of anyone who is already aware of the information, unless the speaker emphasizes some point that the listener may not have realized previously. This is because the statement will not be cause for any harm which otherwise would not have come about.

Rambam takes this a step further, stating that if a potentially harmful statement was made in the presence of three people, the three are permitted to relate the information in conversation with others. This is because each of the three can assume that the other two will probably make the information public anyway. However, this would not be permissible if either:

One of the three is known to be discreet or especially careful regarding the laws of forbidden speech, or
The person’s intent in relating the information is to publicize the matter yet further.

According to the Chofetz Chaim, Rambam permits any of the three to repeat the information even if it is derogatory.

The Chofetz Chaim fails to find justification for such leniency; furthermore, he discourages reliance on Rambam’s opinion with regard to loshon hora spoken in the presence of three, as most other commentators seem to disagree with his ruling. Thus, one should never relate derogatory information, even when it was related to three or more listeners.

Unlike statements that are derogatory, a non-derogatory but potentially harmful statement can be made about a person if it is clear that he does not object.

If someone regularly talks about his inability to remember even his own phone number, it would not be forbidden for others to repeat that statement, provided that neither the speaker nor the listener thinks any less of the person on account of his poor memory.

Certainly, if a person explicitly grants permission for others to disclose potentially harmful information about himself, they are permitted to do so, provided that the information is not derogatory.

Making a statement about a product that would discourage people from buying it constitutes speaking loshon hora as it could harm the livelihood of either the manufacturer or the storekeeper who sells it. (In certain situations, however, this would be permissible, as will be discussed later.)

Similarly, it is forbidden to make a cynical comment about a speaker that could either discourage people from attending his lectures, or weaken the impact of his message.

As with any mitzvah, a child should be trained to avoid speaking loshon hora as soon as he reaches the age of understanding in this regard. It is common for children to denigrate the food they are served, causing hurt to the cook. Children should be trained to avoid making such comments.

Any information that, although not derogatory, could harm an individual’s opportunity for a job or a shidduch should it become known, may not be related. This form of loshon hora is common when people are approached for information regarding a shidduch or a job interview.

It is forbidden to talk of an individual’s physical weakness or lack of intelligence even if neither the speaker nor the listener views these shortcomings as negative. Sharing such information could prove harmful.

In Day 8, we saw that one may not mention that someone is a baal teshuvah if either the speaker or listener considers this derogatory (which, in fact, it is not). Based on the prohibition against relating negative information or information that could cause harm or hurt, it is permissible to relate that a person is a baal teshuvah only if, in addition to the speaker and listener not considering this to be derogatory, the baal teshuvah himself is open about his past and if this fact were mentioned in his presence he would not feel hurt; or (in a case where the baal teshuvah is sensitive about his past) the listener is known to be discreet and the information will never be passed on to others.

One who conveys information to others has no control over who will hear it and in what setting it will be repeated. Whatever one says concerning another person may very well be repeated in the presence of that person.

It is therefore forbidden to say anything about a person that might embarrass him if it were to be repeated in his presence, even if the information is not derogatory.

It is forbidden to relate that an individual is a baal teshuvah if the person is sensitive about this fact. This is true even in a community where baalei teshuvah are highly respected.

Thus far we have focused on statements which are derogatory in nature. The second category of loshon hora involves statements that could potentially cause harm to a person, be it physical, emotional or financial.

The Talmud teaches that gramma b’nizakin assur, it is forbidden to cause a person damage indirectly. Thus, any form of speech, even if not derogatory, but which may cause harm to someone, constitutes loshon hora and is forbidden.

We have seen that to speak derogatorily of one’s fellow is to degrade one’s own status as a creation b’tzelem Elokim (in God’s image).

For one who speaks loshon hora, the teshuva (repentance) process is the same as for all sins between man and his Creator: confession, sincere regret, and the resolution never to speak loshon hora again.

One is not required to discuss the matter with the subject on one’s sinful words and seek his forgiveness, unless actual harm was caused. (Teshuvah for having caused harm through loshon hora will be discussed later.)

Any information that, although not derogatory, could harm an individual’s opportunity for a job or a shidduch should it become known, may not be related. This form of loshon hora is common when people are approached for information regarding a shidduch or a job interview.

It is forbidden to talk of an individual’s physical weakness or lack of intelligence even if neither the speaker nor the listener views these shortcomings as negative. Sharing such information could prove harmful.

While the Scriptural prohibition against loshon hora applies only to speaking about the living, our Sages prohibit making slanderous remarks about the deceased.

It is also forbidden to speak negatively of our beloved land, Eretz Yisrael. As the Torah relates, the generation that merited to be liberated from Egypt spent forty years in the Wilderness and died there because of evil speech concerning the Land ( See Bamidbar chs. 13-14).

In truth, it is proper to avoid focusing on the negative unnecessarily even when discussing non-sacred objects. The early commentators tell of the wise man and his students who came upon the carcass of an animal. When the students commented on its foul odor, the wise man responded, “But see how white are its teeth!”

The Torah states: Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people (Vayikra 19:16). From the word among your people, our Sages derive that it is forbidden to speak loshon hora about a Jew only when he is one who acts in the way of your people.

It is not shameful to focus on the shortcomings of a wicked person. The term “wicked person” refers to a malicious offender. However, one who sins out of ignorance or temptation is in the category of amecha and it is forbidden to speak loshon hora about him (unless it is for a constructive purpose, as will be discussed later).

While statements which have a negative connotation are prohibited, this would not apply where the listener can be expected to understand that nothing derogatory was intended.

Therefore, halachah permits making an ambiguous statement if:
(1) Nothing derogatory is intended; and

(2) The unintended meaning of the statement is only mildly derogatory; and

(3) The statement is made in the presence of three people or in the presence of the person being discussed.

As an illustration, the early commentators offer the statement, “In that house, something is always cooking on the stove.” This could mean that this family’s door is always open to guests, or it can mean that the family is overindulgent. If the statement were to be made in the presence of three, one can safely assume that it would eventually become known to the family of whom it was said. Such being the case, the listeners would assume that the speaker intended it as a compliment. It would also be permissible to make such a statement in the presence of the family of whom it is said, since it would be obvious to all that there was no derogatory intent.

A Jew is responsible for exercising caution in speech and not making statements which can be misinterpreted as being derogatory.

An example of an ambiguous statement that should not be said is: “He’s a well-meaning fellow,” which can mean, “He’s well-meaning but not very intelligent, or, “He’s well-meaning but his actions are wrong.” If one simply means, “He’s well-meaning and sincere,” then this should be made clear

A derogatory statement is considered loshon hora even when the information is common knowledge for, as stated above, to speak negatively of one’s fellow Jew is shameful in itself.

Negative information about Jews appearing in newspapers may not be repeated. Newspapers often publish articles based on hearsay and thus, one is not even permitted to believe such information if the newspaper is its only source. Even after one has verified the information, he may nevertheless not repeat it.

It is forbidden to speak derogatorily about someone even when the subject has made it known that he does not mind if such things are said of him.

As mentioned above, to speak negatively of one’s fellow is shameful in itself, regardless of the subject’s feelings. Speaking loshon hora is contrary to man’s exalted status as the only creature who was fashioned b’tzelem Elokim, in the Divine image – and this is not altered by the fact that one has been granted permission to speak derogatorily.

It is forbidden to relate derogatory information about someone even when the speaker mentions that he himself has the very same shortcoming or is guilty of having committed the same act. This is derived from G-d’s rebuke of the prophet Yeshayah for his having referred to himself as “a man of impure lips dwelling among people of impure lips” (Yeshayahu 6:5).

Loshon hora cannot be spoken even when it is clear that one is not speaking out of malice or with intention to malign. Thus, one cannot relate negative information about his loved ones.

Another area involving loshon hora is that of past history. It is forbidden to relate something about an individual’s past which either the speaker or the listener considers shameful, though in reality it is not shameful at all.

Our Sages teach that “at the place where baalei teshuvah (returnees to the path of Torah) stand, perfect tzaddikim (those who have always been righteous) cannot stand” (Berachos 34b). Thus, there is nothing shameful about a baal teshuvah. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to relate that someone is a baal teshuvah if either the speaker or the listener looks down at such people. (Related laws regarding baalei teshuvah will be discussed in Day 20).

It would seem that there is nothing derogatory about a statement of taste. To say, “I don’t like dry wine,” is a description of the speaker’s preferences and not a critical evaluation of the wine.

Ostensibly, then, one should be allowed to say that one does not like the oratory style of a given lecturer. In fact, however, such statements are generally prohibited, for they imply that the speaker lacks effectiveness.

Previously, we saw that a statement which is essentially derogatory is forbidden, regardless of the speaker’s opinion regarding that statement. Conversely, it is forbidden to utter a statement which, essentially, is not derogatory, if either the speaker or the listener considers it derogatory.

An illustration of this would be where an individual’s mode of dress is being discussed. Although there may be nothing wrong with the way the person dresses, nevertheless, it is forbidden to say that the individual dresses in that manner, if either the speaker or listener has an unfavorable impression of those who dress that way.

It is forbidden to say that someone possesses a negative character trait. For example, it is forbidden to say that an individual is quick-tempered, argumentative, stingy, arrogant, etc.To say that someone is of bad character is forbidden as it is a derogatory statement. However, to indicate that someone is of average character (for example, that he does not overlook the wrong done to him) – while not complimentary – is also not derogatory and may be permissible. In common situations where the term “average” has negative connotations; such a statement would also constitute loshon hora.On the basis of the principle of relative statements discussed previously (Day 4), the claim that a person known for his piety is, in actuality, no better than average, is certainly loshon hora.

Certain statements are loshon horawhen said regarding one person, yet are perfectly acceptable when said regarding someone else. For example, to say that a businessman studies Torah five hours a day is obviously not derogatory. However, to say this of a kollel member who is assumed to be spending his entire day engrossed in Torah study would be derogatory. Similarly, it would be forbidden to relate the amount of tzedakahgiven by an individual, if that amount is considered respectable only for a man of lesser means.[There may be factors which would prohibit relating such information even when it is clearly complimentary. For example, people who give charity generously often do not want that fact to become public knowledge.]

It is forbidden to say that an individual lacks commitment in fulfilling a particular commandment. Therefore, it is forbidden to say that a man sets aside little time for daily Torah study, or that he does not go out of his way to help others.This would apply even if the speaker and listener themselves study little or are not known for their benevolence, and will openly admit to this without shame. Since the Torah commands us to make Torah study and chesed performance priorities in our lives, it is forbidden to say that someone else lacks dedication in these areas.

Loshon Hora (lit. evil talk) is defined as information which is either derogatory or potentially harmful to another individual.  A derogatory statement about someone is loshon hora, even if it will definitely not cause that person any harm.  To focus on the shortcomings of another person is itself wrong.

A statement that could potentially bring harm to someone – be it financial, physical, psychological or otherwise – is loshon hora, even if the information is not negative.

(It should be noted that the term loshon hora refers even to true statements which are derogatory or harmful.  Negative statements that are untrue or inaccurate are termed hotzaas shem ra, slander.)