Author: Acquire@pos

One who knows of a shidduch in the making and has negative information about one of the parties has a responsibility – in certain cases – to offer this information without waiting to be asked.

The commandment “Do not stand aside while your brother’s blood is shed” (Vayikra 19:16) requires one to volunteer information if he is aware that one party in a proposed match has severe physical, psychological or spiritual shortcomings, which by objective standards can be expected to interfere with the marriage, and that this information is being concealed from the other party.

Once again, the conditions which permit speaking negatively for a constructive purpose must be fulfilled:

(1) The information must be firsthand or clearly stated as secondhand and not verified.

(2) It must clearly be a problem by objective standards (e.g. a debilitating disease in the person, or in the family if it is hereditary; severe psychological disorders; violent tendencies; major problems in hashkafa [outlook on basic issues of Jewish life]; an immoral lifestyle) and not a matter of personal opinion – even if one feels certain that this is not what the other party wants. It must also be clear that the information is being concealed from the other party.

(3) If it is possible to convince the party that is concealing the information, to come forth with it, that would be preferable.

(4) The information is not to be exaggerated and only that which is necessary may be told.

(5) One’s intent must be to prevent a harmful situation from coming about and not to denigrate the party spoken about. Moreover, there must be a real possibility that the information conveyed will not be ignored, so that the constructive purpose will be realized.

(6) No realistic alternative to conveying the information directly can be found.

(7) No undue harm will be caused by informing the party of the problem. Should there be reason to suspect that the party, upon learning that it has been deceived, will denigrate the other party or seek revenge in some other way, one should not get involved.

Subjective questions about people are most difficult to answer:

“Is he a talmid chacham?”“Is she intelligent?”

Each of these terms is relative, for at what point does a student of Torah become a “talmid chacham,” and how does one measure intelligence? Lack of a definitive barometer is a problem with most character traits as well, making accurate evaluations in these areas extremely difficult.

Furthermore, we have seen that one may not provide information that could prevent a match from materializing unless the information provides valid basis for this. How, then, does one correctly provide information when asked?

It is clear that it is unwise for a party to approach an acquaintance with a request for such information. In fact, the Chofetz Chaim says that such inquires warrant no response. However, one may bring such questions before a rav, rosh yeshiva, or seminary dean, etc. who has the wisdom and experience to evaluate a situation properly and offer an appropriate response. Others who are approached with such questions may direct the person to the proper authority.

Unlike the Shadchan (matchmaker) or advisor, a third party who is approached with specific questions about one of the parties is not offering advice. His primary concern, therefore, is not the sin of misleading others. His main responsibility is to be honest, and to refrain from speaking that which might constitute loshon hora.

If asked whether the other party has a specific relevant shortcoming, it is certainly correct to tell the truth. For example, if one is asked about the person’s character, and is aware that he has an uncontrollable temper, this must be told, l’toeles (for a constructive purpose). Of course, the preconditions for relating such information are required (second-hand information must be presented as such; constructive intent is required; and one may relate only that which is accurate and necessary).

If however, one is approached for information that on an objective level is irrelevant but in the eyes of this party is important, one is faced with a dilemma. To provide the information is, in effect, assisting in the unjustified abrogation of a potentially successfulshidduch. On the other hand, one does not have the right to mislead the party by way of false information, and in so doing, decide the person’s future for him without his knowledge. The Chofetz Chaim suggests that in such cases one defer by saying,” I don’t know.” (Why this does not constitute falsehood will be discussed later.)

In summation then, if, for example, an eligible young man is insistent that the woman he marries be at least four years younger than he, should never have failed an exam in elementary school, or comply with some other stipulation of seeming irrelevance, one who is asked concerning such matter should simply say, “I don’t know.” However, a shadchan may not suggest someone who does not meet these terms without first consulting a rav.

The previous rules apply to the initiator of a shidduch, employment or business partnership. Halacha classifies such a person as an advisor and requires that he not make the suggestion if he has reason to suspect that it may not be in the best interest of either party.

A similar set of rules applies to one who did not make the suggestion, but whose advice is sought by one of the parties. He too must not be guilty of misleading the people involved. In fact, his responsibility is even greater than that of the shadchan (matchmaker). Whereas the shadchan merely suggests that the shidduch be considered, the advisor often states a definitive opinion regarding the proposed relationship which may profoundly influence the party’s final decision.

Giving advice is not a matter to be taken lightly. One does not give guidance unless he believes he understands the situation, and has the insight and life experience necessary to properly direct his petitioner. One should never encourage a match he knows nothing about for the sake of seeing to it that the person “finally gets married.” One may encourage a match only if he sincerely believes that it is good for both parties.Thus, while the advisor’s first obligation is to the party he is advising, it is forbidden for him to encourage a shidduch that he clearly knows is bad for the other party. This would be considered speaking loshon hora in the form of speech that causes harm.

It is forbidden for an advisor to discourage a relationship unless his disapproval is based on firsthand information that was carefully analyzed.

Finally, if an advisor encouraged his petitioner to pursue a given shidduch but his advice was ignored, he may not draw the conclusion that the person “just doesn’t want to get married,” is “incapable of making commitments,” or has “unrealistic expectations.” To make such statements would be to speak loshon hora and perhaps hotzaas shem ra (slander).

In light of the prohibition of misleading one’s fellow (see Days 79-80), one may be reluctant to suggest shidduchim (marriage matches) altogether; others may feel it necessary to mentionevery possible shortcoming of the person so as not to be guilty of misrepresenting the truth.

Few acts of chesed (kindness) can compare with that of helping to build a Jewish home. One who thinks that a certain young man may be a suitable match for a certain young woman is not responsible to investigate the two and their families before proposing the match. That is the responsibility of the parties involved and their parents.

However, the prohibition against misleading one’s fellow requires that one not suggest a shidduch unless:
(1) He believes that given what he knows of their personalities, the two could be a good match, and he is unaware of any reason the relationship should cause pain to either one.

(2) In his opinion, there is reason to believe that their meeting will ultimately result in an engagement. (It is wrong to waste a person’s time, energy and emotions!)

(3) He is not aware of any medical, emotional, or character deficiency that would render one party unfit for marriage.

(4) He does not feel that either party will have a negative influence upon the other.

(5) He is not aware that one party lacks something that the other is insistent upon, or has something to which the other has explicitly expressed strong objection.

Should there be any doubt as to whether any of these conditions have been met; the counsel of a talmid chacham (a very learned person) should be sought.

There are times when a ravmay permit suggesting a shidduch and temporarily concealing information which could prevent the shidduch from coming about.

Occasionally, a situation exists as a result of which people might be reluctant to even consider a shidduch(3) with a particular person or family, though, in fact, the situation need not warrant such reluctance.It is in such a case that a rav may permit an initial meeting (and at times even a series of meetings) without the pertinent fact being mentioned, so that when it finally is revealed, the person stands a chance of being judged fairly.

However, it is forbidden to conceal the information until after the other party has developed strong, positive feelings concerning the shidduch, for at that point, the party will be denied the opportunity to reach an objective decision, and will have been the victim of dishonesty and manipulation.

Needless to say, such decisions are not to be made by a shadchan (matchmaker) and certainly not by the family involved. Only a qualified Torah authority should decide such matters.

We have seen that it is forbidden to attempt to involve someone in a situation that the person would not want, would he be aware of certain facts.

If an acquaintance is seeking a person with years of experience with whom to start a business, one may not recommend someone who appears to be experienced but, in fact, is not – unless the acquaintance is told this. This holds true even if the person possesses natural talent which seems to compensate for his lack of experience.

Often, people feel that they know what their friend is “really looking for” far better than the friend himself does, and feel justified in deceiving the friend by providing inaccurate information about a perspective shidduch (marriage match), or employee, with the aim of seeing the shidduch or hiring realized.

It is presumptuous and arrogant for one to think that he has the right to make others’ life decisions for them.
Furthermore, it should be understood that the human personality is complex. Logically, one may seem to have found the perfect match for his friend. Nevertheless, if one’s friend has developed an attitude – irrational though it may be – that he or she will only marry someone who meets a particular specification, hiding the truth about a prospective mate could have lifelong repercussions. Upon discovering the truth after the wedding, the person might spend the rest of is married life feeling that he settled for second best. Even if he was told the truth right before the wedding and nevertheless went through with it, feelings of disappointment might surface later.

Such practices, though well intended, constitute giving bad advice and are in violation of “Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block.”

The next set of rules concerns information which, if provided, could prevent a potential relationship (e.g. business partnership, shidduch {marriage match}, hiring a worker) from materializing.

In these cases, Halachah differentiates between three situations:

(1) Where one suggests the relationship;
(2) Where one is called on to answer questions from one party concerning the other;
(3) Where one is in a position to volunteer information to either one of the parties about the other though it has not been requested.

These three situations involve different Torah commandments and therefore are to be dealt with using varying criteria.

When suggesting that someone consider entering into a relationship with someone else, one must be mindful of the commandment Lifnei ivair lo sitain michshol, Before a blind person do not place a stumbling block (Vayikra 19:14), which our Sages interpret as an admonition not to offer aitza sheaino hogenes, advice which is not proper.

It is absolutely forbidden to suggest someone as a possible employee, business partner, or marriage partner if one is aware that:

(1) Objectively speaking, it may not be good for the people involved, or
(2) it does not satisfy the subjective needs and tastes of both parties.

Not only is it cruel to subject people to situations that are bad for them, it is also wrong to involve the unsuspecting in relationships they would not have wanted had they known the facts.

Another form of constructive speech is that which prevents or breaks up a relationship that is harmful to at least one of the parties. It is correct to suggest that someone distance himself from a person or persons who may have a negative influence upon him. Similarly, it is proper to inform a parent that someone may be having a negative influence on his child. All preconditions must, of course, be fulfilled – including verification of fact constructive intent (see Days 43-50). If the information is not firsthand it may nevertheless be conveyed, provided that it is clearly being presented as secondhand information.

With regard to the requirement of accuracy of the information, the Chofetz Chaim(1) suggests that exaggeration may be permissible if that is the only way to convince the person or parent to end the relationship.

The Chofetz Chaim adds that it is imperative to explain why conveying the information does not constitute speaking loshon hora, especially when speaking to a child.

We have seen (Day 11) that it is forbidden to discuss someone’s faults even with people who are aware of these deficiencies, for to focus on a person’s weaknesses is lowly.

However, when teaching or offering guidance, one may make use of real-life illustrations of improper behavior in other people and even refer to those people by name, provided that the listeners are already familiar with the behavior of these people. The use of actual situations to which the listener can relate will deliver a message that mere discussion cannot convey. Reference to negativity here is constructive and is not considered lowly.

Therefore, it is permissible to make reference to the life-style of a non-observant Jew to emphasize weaknesses in his behavior and its consequences, though his lack of observance is rooted in ignorance. However, one should be careful not to condemn the person.

One may not use examples from the past history of a baal teshuva without his permission. Constructive intent is not a license for possible embarrassment.

It is also wrong to use examples from the lifestyles of different ethnic groups within the Jewish nation unless it is clear that neither speaker nor listener is unsympathetic towards that group.

The Talmud teaches that one is permitted to speak loshon hora about baalei machlokes, men of strife, who are at the forefront of a community feud. The purpose of speaking out against such individuals is to encourage other members of the community to dissociate themselves from them. Isolating instigators of a dispute can help restore tranquility to a community torn by strife. The undisputed rav of a community could, for example, urge his constituents to refrain from conversing with certain individuals, so as not to give them an opportunity to develop a following to create strife.

However, disparagement of one party in a dispute by the other usually results in mudslinging which further escalates the dispute. That is not at all what the Sages had in mind when they permitted speaking against baalei machlokes.

The Mishnah (Avos 5:20) contrasts machlokes l’sheim shamayim, a dispute for the sake of Heaven, with one that is not. The former is epitomized by the disputes of Hillel and Shammai whose differing views in matters of halacha, Jewish Law, are reverently studied and pondered generation after generation as eternal components of the Oral Law. The latter is epitomized by the dispute of Korach, whose personal feud against Moshe Rabbeinu earned him an untimely death and eternal dishonor. As the Chofetz Chaim notes in his preface to Sefer Chofetz Chaim, one whose sinful talk fuels strife transgresses the prohibition, “that he not be like Korach and his assembly” (Bamidbar 17:5, see Sanhedrin 110a).

To the Jew, intellectual disagreement in a common search for truth is an integral part of life. As a spiritual, thinking people, Jews are forever involved in discussion of ideas.

Conversely, personal bickering, jealousy, and competition are signs of immaturity and weakness. They have no place in the world of the Jew.

The difficulty, however, lies in our tendency to transform every dispute into an ideological one. Korach, too, came with a philosophy: that all Jews are equally holy, and thus there is no justification for one family, Aharon and his Kohanim descendants, to be above everyone else. The sages teach that Korach’s argument was rooted in jealousy, resulting from his having been passed over for the position of prince of his Levite family.Before embarking on an ideological campaign against others, one must ask himself: “Am I honestly promoting the cause of truth, or am I involved in a personal feud disguised as an ideological debate?”
Ideological disagreement should never lead to personal animosity. When Torah scholars disagree, their dispute is over ideals, and is never personal. When a scholar is involved in a dispute, his followers must be careful not to become involved in a matter that is not their own, and certainly should avoid character assassination and personal hatred towards his opponent.

Yet another situation where negative speech may be in order is where one is the victim of false accusation and wishes to divulge the identity of the real culprit to vindicate himself. Whether or not this is permissible depends on the nature of the crime.

If the crime is of a type that would halachically, by Jewish law, require the observer to inform either the victim or others of the culprit’s identity, he should do so.

If there is no constructive purpose in revealing the culprit’s identity other than to vindicate oneself, it would be forbidden for the accused to name the culprit. The accused should declare his innocence and refrain from incriminating anyone else.

In a situation where only two people are possible suspects, which means that a denial on the part of one is tantamount to an accusation against the other, it is permissible to deny the charges provided that the act committed was indeed improper. However, if the alleged offense was, in fact, an innocent statement or action, the accused should not deny it. Denial would implicate the other person who, in this case, is guilty of no real crime.

It is a middas chassidus (measure of piety) to accept the blame in all cases, unless revealing the identity of the guilty party serves a constructive purpose. Also, one should not accept the blame for an act which would reflect badly on the community or on observant Jews in general, as this would constitute a chilul Hashem, desecration of God’s name.

A most sensitive area of constructive speech is that of kashrus.

Raising doubts regarding the reliability of a hechsher (rabbinical endorsement) without reliable information constitutes speaking loshon hora. If one has reason to suspect that a hechsher is inferior, the matter should be discussed with a competent rav, who can offer guidance as to how one should proceed. Even if one rav suggests that a hechsher not be relied upon, this does not necessarily mean that the hechsher is definitely unreliable. It is the rav of the community who should decide the status of a hechsher for his constituents, or else direct them to a recognized posek (halachic authority) for his decision.

In a case of a questionable product manufactured by a local Orthodox Jew who assumes responsibility for his product and does not operate under a hechsher, extreme caution must be exercised before declaring the product non-kosher. Only the local rav or posek is in a position to decide the halachic status of the item, after taking all factors into consideration. Causing a Jew to close down his business is a very serious matter and preventing such a situation may even outweigh the observance of chumros (unrequired halachic stringencies) generally kept by the community.

It is permissible to warn people that a product is dangerous – that is, if the warning is truly warranted. Countless items are potentially dangerous if misused, and many processed foods are unhealthy if consumed in large quantities; in such cases, labeling the item “dangerous” is wrong. Labeling an item as unsafe is justified only if such a declaration is considered reasonable by normal standards. (See Day 43, condition 2.) Furthermore, if the information is not known firsthand, this must be mentioned when relating the information (see Day 43).

If the manufacturer is Jewish, he must be spoken to first (see Day 45). Failure to fulfill the above conditions would render the statement loshon horaas it would cause harm to the manufacturer, as well as to the consumer who will needlessly avoid the product.

It is permissible to inform friends and neighbors of a store where they can obtain items of better quality or at better prices than at the store where they usually shop.

Here too certain conditions have to be met:

One should know the information firsthand. (If one cannot verify the information firsthand, he would have to say, “I have heard, but have not verified that…” [see Day 43].) He must be certain that the quality of the other merchandise is superior (brand names are not necessarily better); where there is a significant difference in price, one must verify that the less expensive item is not inferior in quality to the more expensive one.

There must also be no suspicion that the preferred store is dealing in stolen merchandise, as Halachah(1)prohibits purchasing stolen goods.

In conveying the information, it is important not to imply that the first storekeeper is overcharging or is guilty of selling inferior products; one must convey the pertinent information without being judgmental. Furthermore, since people often view high pricing in a negative way, the information may be considered derogatory and could only be conveyed for a constructive purpose. Consequently, one may only relate the information to people who may be interested in making a purchase. Discussing the matter for the sake of making conversation might constitute loshon hora (2).

Finally, one should consider why he deems it necessary to relate the information altogether. Perhaps it would be better not to get involved and refrain from any action which would affect the storekeeper’s income.

Consumer protection is an important – but sensitive – area which allows for information to be conveyed l’toeles, for a constructive purpose.

If a storekeeper hands a customer too little change, or charges him for something he did not purchase, one must not assume that the storekeeper is dishonest or careless – we all make mistakes. If this happens often, one must bring the matter to the storekeeper’s attention and inform him that if the practice continues, one will have no choice but to inform his clientele. If the situation still does not change, one is required to warn people to count their change carefully and examine their receipts for any mistakes. It is forbidden to insinuate that the man is dishonest even if one has reason to suspect so, since it is sufficient for people to think that he is careless (or has problems with his arithmetic) for them to take the necessary precautions.

It would also be forbidden to inform hot-headed individuals who, for example, might vandalize the store in the name of justice.

An obvious case where conveying negative information is required is where a person is overheard plotting to harm someone. While we have seen that when a Jew may be in danger, even secondhand information can be related, it is imperative that one first determine that the plot is apparently serious and not a bad joke.

The condition that one first reprove the person against whom he intends to speak (see Day 45) applies only if one believes he can change the alleged plotter’s attitude. Otherwise, warning him would only induce him to modify the plot to ensure that it not be uncovered.

The remaining conditions are required here no less than in an ordinary case of constructive speech: One’s intent must be solely to avert harm (and not, for example, for the pleasure of thwarting the plotter); if an alternative exists – including not revealing the identity of the plotter – then that avenue must be pursued. Also, one must be reasonably sure that the plotter will not be caused undue harm. If the potential victim is known to be hot-tempered and can be expected to take revenge, he cannot be spoken to. Alternative means would have to be found to protect the victim without endangering the plotter. (The case of one who overhears a plotter will be discussed in greater detail in the laws of rechilus, gossipmongering.)

Unlike other cases of constructive purpose, protecting someone from possible harm is permissible even when no firsthand information is available. If one happens to hear that one Jew is plotting to harm another, it is permissible to advise the potential victim to beware of the suspected plotter. In such a case, where the suspicions are based on hearsay, the information must not be presented as fact. It should be clearly stated that the concerns stem from unconfirmed secondhand information that may or may not be true.

The Chofetz Chaim maintains that although one who fails to warn his fellow Jew of impending danger is in violation of, “Do not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is being shed,” this does not apply when one is unable to personally verify that danger does, indeed, exist. Nevertheless, it is proper to convey even secondhand information if this might spare someone harm.

The Torah commands us: “Do not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is being shed (Vayikra 19:16)”. We are obligated to spare no effort in preventing our fellow Jew from suffering physical, emotional, or monetary damage.

In a situation where a potential victim is unaware that he is being threatened, one is required to warn him even though this will reflect negatively on the person or persons responsible. Speech of this sort is not merely permissible, it is obligatory. Nevertheless, one must be certain that conditions which render speech constructive have been appropriately met (see Days 42-50).

It is permissible to speak negatively about someone who was guilty of verbal abuse, in order to comfort his victim. The pain and humiliation caused by insulting speech can be minimized by pointing out to the victim that the perpetrator lacks intelligence or discretion and that people do not take him seriously.

At a later point in time, it would be important to help the victim understand the nature and problems of the perpetrator so that he can learn how to deal with the person and prevent recurrence of such incidents.

An important area of speech which is considered constructive is that which helps to relieve someone of psychological or emotional damage caused by others.

It is permissible for anyone who is suffering emotionally or psychologically to seek appropriate help even if this involves discussions of people and events that would otherwise constitute loshon hora. If possible, names should be omitted, and only pertinent information should be shared.

The Chofetz Chaim speculates that it may be considered constructive for a person troubled by an issue to unburden himself to someone even if only to relieve himself of stress. Obviously, this applies to especially difficult situations and not to the daily vicissitudes of life.

We have seen (Days 63-66) that even when it is clear to someone that one person has wronged another financially, he may not attempt to effect justice outside the confines of halachah. This applies not only to a witness, but also to the victim himself.

If one feels that he has fallen victim to another person’s dishonesty, and after verifying the facts concludes that he has a valid claim against that person, he must not publicly speak against that person for the sake of attaining restitution. Rather, he should confront the individual privately and, if necessary, consult a rav. If possible, the name of the accused should not be mentioned.

A witness may not divulge to the victim the identity of the perpetrator, if the victim could be expected to employ halachically unacceptable tactics to retrieve his money.

If one witnessed a crime which subsequently came before abeis din, rabbinical court, and the accused was acquitted of any wrongdoing, it is forbidden to voice criticism of the beis din’s ruling. One must assume that a court comprised of Torah scholars has done its best to ascertain the facts according to the methods prescribed by halachah (i.e. testimony of two valid witnesses), and has ruled in accordance with Jewish law as detailed in Shulchan Aruch. If one was the sole witness to a crime, then his testimony is invalid, no matter how convincing are his arguments. Furthermore, one must come to terms with the reality that humans are limited in their ability to determine and carry out absolute justice, and ultimately, it is in Hashem’s power to correct social justice.

Certainly one who loses a court case cannot possibly be objective in his evaluation of the beis din’s ruling. The practice of raising questions as to the competence of the beis din, or accusing the judges of bias, is blatant hotzaas shem ra (slander).

Nevertheless, if one suspects that the ruling was the result of an error in the legal process, he could seek the advice of a rabbinic authority and ask that he investigate the matter.

We have seen that it is permissible for a beis din, rabbinical court, to use certain forms of social pressure to persuade an individual to abide by its ruling. However, it is forbidden to use social pressure in order to bypass the court process and force a thief to return what he stole. It is wrong to cause the community to take a stand in a monetary issue on the basis of an individual’s word alone; only through the psak (ruling) of a beis din may the community take a stand. Thus, it is correct to ensure that the parties come before a beis din, but it is forbidden to personally orchestrate the enforcement of what one believes to be justice.

The Torah requires that monetary disputes be adjudicated by a beis din, rabbinical court. It is permissible to exert social pressure on an individual to convince him to agree to participate in a din Torah (court case) before a beis din. However, social pressure that could cause embarrassment is not an option if the person is in the category of amisecha, your fellow (see Day 55). A person who erroneously believes that he is justified in taking someone else’s money must be set straight, but he is not a mumar (rebellious sinner). Embarrassment is not a recourse, but one may discuss the matter with anyone who can influence the person and explain that the person is involved in a monetary dispute and should be persuaded to come before a beis din.

Unlike an individual, a beis din may publicize the fact that an individual refuses to abide by its ruling or has ignored a summons to appear before it. As previously mentioned, social pressure is often the only means by which rabbinical courts can enforce their decision.

The second category of constructive purpose is to help those who are being (or have been) adversely affected by the subject’s behavior.

If one has personally witnessed a Jew causing monetary damage to another, to ensure that the victim will be compensated is a constructive purpose. It would therefore be permissible to relate what has transpired. After ascertaining that the facts are correct, and after having spoken with the perpetrator, one must determine what will result from relating the information and whether or not halachah justifies effecting that result.

In a civilized society, the straightforward way of dealing with crime is to inform the authorities. However, reporting one’s fellow Jew to secular officials may result in his facing punishment undeserved according to Torah. Imprisonment, for example, is not an acceptable means of punishment for monetary infractions, by Torah standards. Providing information that might lead to a Jew’s imprisonment could therefore constitute malshinus (the act of being a malshin, informer). Only if it is clear that an individual is dangerous and poses a threat to others can he be spoken against for the sake of protecting others from harm. Such matters are extremely sensitive and complex, and demand consultation with a competent halachic authority.

Finally, a teacher must be careful not to cause his student undue harm. Halachah permits a teacher to strike a child for educational purposes, and embarrassment may also be justified, if it is for the student’s benefit. (The Talmud states that striking one’s older child is prohibited as it may incite him to hit back.) However, in today’s era of brazenness, corporal punishment even in early childhood often teaches violence rather than discipline, and must be carefully evaluated. Verbal abuse by a teacher can have a decidedly negative effect on his students and may undermine all efforts at educating the students regarding Shmiras Haloshon.

In any situation where embarrassment or physical punishment might result from the teacher relating the student’s problem to others, he may do so only if the consequences are necessary for the student’s growth and development. As mentioned above (Day 26), teachers must also bear in mind the long-term effects of relating or recording negative information about a student.

If after giving a situation much thought, a teacher comes to the conclusion that a particular student has a behavioral or learning problem and feels that it will not be possible to deal with the problem without the involvement of the principal, his colleagues, or the student’s parents, then the teacher should speak to the necessary party without delay.

Condition 5 of constructive speech (see Day 50) is that the speaker’s intent be purely for constructive reasons and not out of anger or frustration. This could be extremely trying when the student in question is disruptive and frequently upsets the teacher.

Difficult as it is, teachers must not take students’ behavior personally. The disruptive student is, in most cases, not fighting the teacher; he is struggling with himself as he deals with the challenges of life.

The dedicated teacher often finds it necessary to discuss the progress and difficulties of students with parents, colleagues and principals. A lack of clear guidelines with regard to loshon hora(2) can create either a free-for-all atmosphere, where people talk about anyone with anyone, or, at the other extreme, a simplistic approach to Shmiras Haloshon(3) which could inhibit the teacher’s effectiveness as an educator.

Generally speaking, the area of chinuch (child education and upbringing) constitutes a constructive purpose which would permit relating negative information concerning a student. However, the specific conditions which permit speaking negatively for a constructive purpose must never be overlooked.

Verification of facts is crucial. For a teacher to play amateur psychologist and hastily diagnose the student as having some complex disability or disorder without pursuing the matter properly constitutes recklessness – and the consequences can be devastating. To communicate one’s evaluation under such circumstances would be hotzaas shem ra (slander). It is an unfortunate fact that certain problematic children have not succeeded only as a result of having been misunderstood by a teacher, whose labeling tainted the image of that student in the eyes of all his future teachers.

A teacher must make every effort to fully understand the behavior of each student; he must not be swift to condemn. It is essential that a student feel comfortable about expressing his true feelings to his teacher (in a respectable manner, of course). Conditions 1-4 of constructive speech (see Day 50) necessitate a good heart-to-heart talk with the student before reporting a problem (unless one suspects that serious danger may be imminent).

Helping one’s fellow to improve his character also falls within the realm of toeles, constructive purpose. If an acquaintance requires character refinement, then the mitzvah to reprove one’s fellow Jew requires one to bring the matter to that person’s attention with care and sensitivity. However, if one feels incapable of offering reproof and knows that others are also aware of this person’s character deficiencies, he is permitted to discuss the matter with them and seek their advice or involvement, if necessary. Though we have seen that it is lowly and forbidden to speak negatively of someone even with those who are already aware of the information, constructive speech is not at all lowly.

Should one find it necessary to consult with someone who is unaware of this person’s deficiencies for guidance in how to approach the person, he may do so, for this too constitutes constructive speech. However, if it is possible to discuss the issue without mentioning names, then this course must be followed.We have already seen (Day 53) that if one seeks the active involvement of someone who is unaware of the situation, that individual would have to investigate the matter personally and verify the facts before taking definitive action.

Even where it is permissible to speak negatively for a constructive purpose, one must avoid insincere flattery. It is forbidden to be critical of someone when he is not present, yet demonstrate approval of his behavior in his presence. If the concern is that the person’s feelings not be hurt, then the solution is to express respect and concern for him as a person, but clear disapproval of his behavior.

If one is certain that reproof will be ignored, and is therefore prepared to publicize the person’s behavior as an attempt to induce him to change his ways, one must nevertheless approach the sinner first, so as not to be suspected of insincerity.

In the above case, where it is clear that the person will not be moved by rebuke, one can remove the need for first speaking to him by dispelling any possible suspicions concerning one’s own sincerity. For example, if one speaks against the perpetrator in public (in the presence of three) rather than speaking to individual members of the community in private, it becomes clear to all that the speaker could not be attempting to gain favor with the perpetrator by showing acceptance of his behavior. Similarly, if the speaker is known to be zealous and outspoken and would not be suspected of flattery, he could resort to private discussion. Also, if it is clear to all that the perpetrator is a difficult personality, and publicly criticizing his behavior could be dangerous, then one may speak against him in private without fear of personal suspicion.

Based on the rules we have just studied, the rules of loshon hora vis-a-vis the totally non-observant Jew become clear.

(1) The average non-observant Jew today has been deprived of a meaningful Jewish education. Whether or not he has been exposed to Orthodox Jewish life, society has prevented him from taking Torah seriously. Rambam compares such a person to a tinok shenishbah, a kidnapped Jewish child whose kidnappers reared him with non-Torah ideals, and whose transgressions are committed out of ignorance. Such a person may be in the category of both amecha, your people and amiso, hisfellow. It is our obligation to educate him with love, care, and sensitivity and it is strictly forbidden to speak loshon hora against him.

(2) A non-observant Jew who did receive a meaningful Jewish education, has been taught Torah values and knows that what he is doing is wrong, but claims that observance is too difficult, is a rebel due totemptation. He is considered part of amecha, your people, which means that loshon hora may be spoken of him only if it is for a constructive purpose. However, he is not considered amisecha, your fellow, and consequently the prohibition of onaas devarim, causing hurt through the spoken word (Vayikra 25:17), will not apply in his case. Social pressure may be used to encourage observance even if he will suffer embarrassment in the process, provided that all the conditions of constructive speech are met. Non-constructive speech that is either derogatory or harmful would constitute loshon hora.

(3) The classic apikores (heretic) who is knowledgeable but rebels is considered neither your brother nor a part of your people. If there exists such a person today, one may speak abouthim without any preconditions.

Traditionally, Jewish communities have used social pressure in dealing with the publicly observant whose private behavior includes blatant violation of basic halachah.

If all else fails, it is permissible to publicize the fact that an otherwise observant Jew is guilty of immorality on a regular basis, if the disclosure will prompt him to repent.

Similarly, rabbinical courts have the authority to post signs informing the public of someone’s refusal (siruv) to comply with a court ruling. Social pressure is often the only means through which rabbinical courts can enforce their decisions.

A mumor l’tayovon (lit., rebel due to temptation) is someone who regularly submits to temptation in violating a specific mitzvah. While the prohibition against gossip mongering does apply with regard to speaking about him (as he is not a heretic), his situation differs drastically from one who occasionally transgresses a given mitzvah but basically is committed to its observance.

As we have learned, the primary prohibition against speaking loshon hora is lo saylaych rachil b’amecha, Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people (Vayikra 19:16). One who embarrasses his fellow Jew transgresses the prohibition lo sonu ish es amiso, A man shall not aggrieve his fellow (Vayikra 25:17).Our Sages interpret the term amecha, your people, in the first prohibition as excluding only a mumor l’hachis, (lit., rebel whose intent is to spite), one whose lack of regard for a given prohibition causes him to regularly transgress it. However, the term, amiso, his fellow, in the second prohibition, excludes even the mumor l’tayovon. Thus, it is forbidden to speak loshon hora about a mumor l’tayovon but it is permissible to exert social pressure on him in order to induce him to mend his sinful way.

It is permissible to publicize that a Jew regularly violates a particular halachah if it is clear that he is aware of the halachah and has chosen to ignore it, and it stands to reason that publicizing his behavior will induce him to change. This applies even if he transgresses the law out of temptation. However, one must be certain that all the conditions of toeles, constructive speech, including purity of intent and lack on an alternative, apply.

In the case of a habitual sinner who ignores a particular commandment altogether, one is to assume that even a questionable act is, in fact, a transgression of that commandment. “Judge your fellow favorably” demands fairness, not naiveté.

Having concluded that the person did transgress, one must then seek to understand why he frequently commits this sin. It may be due to ignorance – he may be totally unaware that the act is forbidden, or he might not realize the severity of the prohibition. Should this be the case, one must find some way of enlightening the person without hurting his feelings. Discussing his behavior with others constitutes speaking loshon hora. (This situation is common among those who were raised in communities where there is widespread violation of certain laws. In such instances, people mistakenly view those who observe these laws as machmirim, individuals who are stringent beyond the letter of the law.)

If a person whose actions may have involved a given transgression is known to commit that particular sin at least occasionally, then the commandment, “Judge your fellow favorably,” does not require that one seek a positive explanation for what he did. However, it is meritorious to give the person the benefit of the doubt and assume that this time he did not sin. Reproof would not be necessary.

If it is absolutely clear that the person did commit a sin, then the mitzvah to reprove does apply and one should, in a respectful and caring manner, help the person to overcome his evil inclination by offering reproof.

There are times when it would be more effective for someone else, such as a close friend or rav, to reprove the individual. Theoretically, it should be permissible for the one who witnessed the transgression to inform the friend or rav of it and ask that he handle the situation. However, we have learned that one may not act on hearsay, which would mean that one cannot possibly offer reproof unless he personally witnessed the transgression. Consequently, it would be one’s responsibility to find an effective means of reproving himself, or to ask the rav to either personally investigate the situation or tactfully discuss the matter with that individual without making accusations.

Before assuming that a person’s actions merit tochachah, reproof, one must be absolutely certain that he has, in fact, sinned.

From the command B’Tzedek Tishpot Amisechah, Judge your fellow favorably (Vayikra19:15), we learn that if a person appears to be committing a transgression which is totally out of character for him, we are to seek to understand what transpired in a positive light. If there is any way to interpret his actions as not involving transgression, we are required to do so.

If it is absolutely clear that the person did sin in a manner which is out of character for him, then we must assume that he immediately regretted his actions, and has already repented. To discuss the incident with anyone constitutes speaking loshon hora.

The first category of constructive purpose is to help the person about whom one is speaking. There is a tendency among many to ignore the misconduct of others in favor of a “live and let live” attitude. Let us first understand why the Torah rejects this attitude.

Every person is born with character flaws. It is our mission in life to change, to grow, to strive for perfection and spirituality. We all want to rid ourselves of our imperfections; people dowant to be good. What makes life so challenging is that negative character traits are blinding. We either lose sight of what our goals should be or rationalize to the point that we simply cannot differentiate between right and wrong.

One of the greatest gifts Hashem has blessed us with is companionship: friends, family, people around us who are close enough to care, yet distant enough to be objective. To abstain from speaking up and offering one another reproof and guidance amounts to depriving one another of one of the most valuable tools for personal growth. We must get involved and, when necessary, even enlist the involvement of others in helping people through the struggles of life. Remaining silent when reproof is called for is not Shmiras Haloshon, it is depriving one’s fellow of his lifeline to self-improvement.

It is permissible to speak negatively about a person:

1. to help the person, or
2. to help anyone victimized by the person, or
3. to resolve major disputes, or
4. to enable others to learn from the mistakes of that person, provided that:

1. one’s remarks are based on first-hand information and careful investigation, and
2. it is apparent that this person is wrong, and
3. the person has been spoken to but refuses to change his behavior, and
4. the statement to be made will be true and accurate, and
5. the intent of the speaker is for a constructive purpose only (and there is a reasonable chance that the intended goal will be accomplished), and
6. there is no alternative means by which to bring about the intended result, and
7. no undue harm will be caused by the statement.The illustrations presented below (as well as those to be discussed in the section on rechilus [gossip]) serve to clarify the application of these conditions.

Condition #7:

As noted above, the permissibility of speaking negatively for a constructive purpose is based upon the principle that it is not lowly to relate negative information for a positive reason.

This applies only to information which is derogatory but harmless. However, it is forbidden to relate harmful information for a constructive purpose. The only exception to this rule is where one has determined that halachah allows for the subject to be harmed in that manner.

Condition #6:

Having ascertained that:
1) The negative information is accurate,
2) The perpetrator was not justified,
3) Reproof has proven unsuccessful,
4) There are no other options,
5) The information will be related accurately:

Two more conditions must still be met before the information can be conveyed.

The speaker must be certain that his sole intent is l’toeles, for a constructive purpose. If he knows that in his heart he is pleased to cast the perpetrator in a bad light, he is not permitted to speak – even though the purpose cannot be accomplished any other way.

It is lowly to enjoy speaking negatively – even for a constructive purpose.

This is especially challenging when one is required to speak about a person whom he does not like. It is necessary to first eradicate any negative feelings towards that person; only then can the negative information be related.

Condition #5:

While derogatory information may be related for a constructive purpose, slander cannot be justified. One does not have the right to exaggerate or alter facts for a constructive purpose, nor may one omit details that minimize the severity of the person’s actions.

Indiscriminate use of superlatives such as “very” can easily distort facts way out of proportion. This is, in fact, a most common form of slander that people engage in, albeit unwittingly. Conversely, one must omit authentic details that make the story sound even worse if the result can be attained without their being mentioned.

Condition #4:

If, in addition to personal reproof, any other option exists that could preclude the necessity to speak negatively of someone, it must be pursued. Negative speech, even for a constructive purpose, is lowly if it can be avoided.

In the same vein, when speaking negatively is necessary, one must carefully calculate just how much must be related in order to achieve the desired result. To relate any unnecessary negative information would be to speak loshon hora.

Furthermore, even if it is clear that someone must be made aware of certain derogatory information about another person, one should choose the least blatant means by which to communicate that information. Directing someone to where he will become aware of information on his own is preferable to expressing it verbally.

In comparing two candidates for a position, stressing the strengths of one is often sufficient without actually articulating what the other lacks. In all cases, the least negative course is the one to follow.

Condition #3:

Before speaking about a person with others, one must first discuss the issue with that person himself. Trying to persuade the sinner to change his ways is a course which must be pursued before bringing anyone else into the picture. (This would not apply if speaking to the sinner might make it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the desired result through any other means.)

Before relating negative information l’toeles, for a constructive purpose, one must carefully consider whether or not his words will, in fact, bring about the desired result. Speaking negatively l’toeles is justified only if there is a reasonable chance that the desired result will be accomplished.

This point is of particular importance when one seeks to discourage a potentially harmful friendship, business association or shidduch (marriage match). Often, a final decision has already been made, and speaking negatively of the other party will serve no constructive purpose.

The fact that a situation falls under one of the previously listed categories does not necessarily mean that discussing it constitutes constructive speech. No less than 7 conditions must be met before a critical statement about an individual may be said.

Condition #1: The first set of conditions deals with verification of facts. It is absolutely forbidden to make any critical statement about a person on the basis of information obtained through hearsay. Only through first-hand information may one assume that a Jew’s character or behavior is wanting. An exception would be where one seeks to protect someone from potential harm; such instances would permit one to pass on second-hand information. This will be discussed later.

Condition #2: Even if one has witnessed seemingly unacceptable behavior, he must not hastily pass judgement on what has occurred. An incident taken out of context can be terribly misleading, both as a reflection on an individual’s character as well as in determining who is right in a dispute between parties. Circumstances must be carefully investigated before one can be sure that he understands a situation correctly. Above all, before concluding that a person has, in fact, transgressed Jewish law, one must be knowledgeable of the relevant halachos.

The most common constructive purposes which justify speaking negatively about a person fall under four categories:

1) To help the person about whom one is speaking (e.g. to discuss a person’s faults with someone else in order to help the person improve).

2) To help those who are being adversely affected by the person’s behavior:

a) Providing help for people physically, psychologically or financially victimized by him;

b) Protecting people from falling victim to his behavior in the future—including warning the unsuspecting who are seriously considering entering into an unhealthy social or business relationship with him.

3) To help put an end to a dispute in which the person is involved and which threatens to divide the community.

4) To help others learn from the person’s mistakes.

Based on the rule that one must endure social and financial loss rather than speak loshon hora, it would seem that there should be no halachic justification to speak loshon hora for a constructive purpose (l’toeles). Why then does the halachah permit constructive statements to be made?

We have noted that all forms of loshon hora fall under one of two categories:
1) Derogatory statements;
2) Statements which have the potential to cause the subject harm.

Derogatory speech was explained as being lowly in that the speaker focuses on the negative aspects of someone’s character or behavior.

There are times when discussing someone’s shortcomings is clearly constructive, and the responsible thing to do. This is true either: when one is attempting to assist the person he is speaking about, or when he is trying to protect others from that person. In such cases, though negative traits or actions are being mentioned, the statements made do not constitute loshon hora. Destructive speech is loshon hora; constructive speech is not. Similarly, there is no such thing as “constructive rechilus” (gossip); a statement can be classified as rechilus only if it is destructive.

Nevertheless, the Chofetz Chaim refers to derogatory statements made for a constructive purpose as “loshon hora l’toeles” seemingly for lack of a better term. We, too, have made use of the term “loshon hora (or rechilus) for a constructive purpose” at various points in this work.

A great deal of sensitivity, objectivity, and knowledge of halachah is required in order to distinguish between genuine constructive speech and what amounts to nothing more than rationalized loshon hora.

The Chofetz Chaim lists several conditions necessary for a statement to be deemed one of toeles, constructive purpose, as opposed to loshon hora. The conditions for a statement to qualify as constructive—soon to be discussed here—must be studied carefully before taking the liberty of making a statement that would otherwise be considered loshon hora. It would also be wise to discuss the matter with a competent rav, as an incorrect decision could result in irreparable harm.

We have seen that one must be prepared to make sacrifices so that the laws of forbidden speech not be violated.

In the world of business, when one’s product is maligned by competitors, the natural and predictable reaction is to respond in kind. Such is not the way of the Torah. There is no basis for the notion that one who has been the object of loshon hora can respond with a counter-offensive of defamation.

As with any Torah prohibition, one cannot justify speaking loshon hora on the basis of personal need or practicality. A Jew must be prepared to forego his comfort, social status, and even livelihood rather than transgress Torah Law. Needless to say, it is forbidden to speak loshon hora to gain popularity or win friendship.

One must not succumb to social pressure and engage in gossip, in the same way that one would not compromise his kashrus standards due to social pressure.

It is forbidden to comply with an employer’s demand that one reveal information which is loshon hora — even if such failure means the loss of one’s job.

Similarly, the commandment to honor one’s father and mother does not justify speaking loshon hora. One must respectfully refuse a parent’s request that derogatory or harmful information be related.

The primary prohibition against speaking loshon hora is: Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people (Vayikra 19:16). However, the Chofetz Chaim demonstrates that this sin can involve the transgression of numerous positive and negative commandments. The baal loshon hora, habitual speaker of loshon hora, can easily accumulate a multitude of transgressions at a rate unparalleled by any other sin. That is why the Sages say that speaking loshon hora is worse than even the most severe sins.

Furthermore, it is virtually impossible for the habitual speaker to ask forgiveness of everyone who was affected by his sinful speech; thus, he will find it difficult if not impossible to achieve full repentance for his sins.

The Sages caution us to avoid associating with a baal loshon hora, and not to live in the vicinity of such people.

Below we will see that in certain situations one may – and sometimes must – provide people with negative information that is important for them to know, either to avoid being harmed or for some other constructive purpose.

Whenever faced with such a situation, one must explain why he is saying something that would ordinarily be prohibited, so that the listener understands that the prohibitions regarding loshon hora are not being transgressed. To say anything that the listener thinks is loshon hora when, in fact, it is not, constitutes speaking avak loshon hora 1.

There is a form of avak loshon hora that can result from one’s keeping the laws of forbidden speech. If one says that he is reluctant to discuss a particular individual so as to avoid speaking loshon hora, he is, in effect, communicating that he knows something negative about that person.

“I’d rather not discuss So-and-so,” is avak loshon hora.

When faced with such a situation, a person must either attempt to divert the conversation to another topic or indicate that he does not know any pertinent information about the person under discussion.

Praising a person in a situation where someone present is likely to temper such praise with criticism is another form of avak loshon hora. It is forbidden to praise in the presence of anyone who is known to dislike him, as it is common for such people to respond by mentioning the person’s shortcomings.

Therefore, it is wrong to praise someone in the presence of a large group of people, since there is a reasonable chance that at least one person in the group dislikes him.

Likewise, it is forbidden to praise a businessman in the presence of his competitors even if they claim to harbor no ill will towards him.

Excessive praise should always be avoided for it can often cause people to respond negatively even when they have no particular dislike for the person being discussed.

Praise which has absolutely no negative connotations can, at times, fall under the category of avak loshon hora. It is forbidden to publicize a person’s hospitality or generosity if this will cause the insincere and undeserving to take advantage of the person, causing him monetary loss and emotional discomfort.

There are times when a speaker makes a positive statement about a person and intends it as such, but negative and harmful information can be inferred from his words. The Torah would not consider one who does this to be a holech rachil, peddler of gossip, since both his intent and his words are clearly sincere and positive.

Rabbinically, however, this too is prohibited, under a category referred to as avak loshon hora, the “dust” of loshon hora, which is spread by way of carelessness.

A common form of avak loshon hora is where one sincerely praises another person, but in doing so, alludes to a shortcoming of that individual.

“Who would have believed that he would have come this far?” clearly suggests something negative about the person. Such a statement can cause the person embarrassment when said in his presence, and can be harmful to him even when he is not present. Hence, it is forbidden.

It is forbidden to relate a story for entertainment purposes only, if it contains derogatory or harmful information.

To relate an amusing incident that would cause embarrassment to any of the people involved if told in their presence constitutes speaking loshon hora. Many a humorous situation is actually quite painful to the person involved.